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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
BUILDING PUBLIC HEALTH IN A RURAL STATE: STRATEGIES FOR 
PREVENTING DISEASE IN KENTUCKY, 1883-1914 
 
During the period from 1883-1914, the Kentucky State Board of Health developed 
strategies for preventing disease in the state by enforcing hard power measures of 
vaccination, quarantine, and isolation of disease suspects, and through the soft power 
measures of written and spoken communication. Throughout this period their efforts to 
prevent and contain disease were limited by inadequate funding as well as opposition from 
the public, local authorities, and the state legislature, demonstrating that while hard power 
measures can be effective in combating disease, they cannot be fully successful without 
support from the people they aim to protect. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1911, nearing the end of his thirty-three-year tenure as secretary of Kentucky’s State 
Board of Health, Dr. Joseph N. McCormack mused that “government is only a great 
partnership formed to do those things which the individual cannot do, or cannot do so well 
or cheaply, for himself.”1 To his mind, the most important of these purposes was the 
protection of the public health, a project which required government resources to be 
successful. McCormack believed that the lives of the men, women, and children under his 
jurisdiction were “more valuable than all other interests combined.”2  
Unfortunately, the state legislature disagreed. Throughout McCormack’s tenure, 
meager appropriations from the state’s lawmakers stymied the board’s efforts to protect 
the public health. In addition, they struggled to secure the cooperation of county fiscal 
officials and the support of the public necessary to prevent disease and contain epidemics. 
This work analyzes the board’s efforts to overcome these challenges and create a viable 
public health infrastructure in the largely rural state of Kentucky. 
 Public health, as many scholars have demonstrated, represents the dual nature of 
government intervention in citizens’ lives by aiding and invading, sometimes in the same 
action. Barbara Rosenkrantz’s work on Massachusetts illustrates the pattern. “With a large 
proportion of the population unable or unwilling to take on personal responsibility to 
conduct their lives in accord with recommended sanitary principles,” she argues, “the state 
 
1 State Board of Health of Kentucky, “General Summary by the Secretary,” Biennial Report of the State 
Board of Health of Kentucky, 1910-1911 in the Bulletin of the State Board of Health of Kentucky 2 no. 2 
(Frankfort, Ky.: Press of the Kentucky State Journal Pub. Co., 1912), 17. 
2 State Board of Health of Kentucky, “General Summary by the Secretary,” Biennial Report of the State 
Board of Health of Kentucky, 1908-1909 (Louisville, Ky.: The Continental Printing Company, 1909), 16. 
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could properly play the role of guardian to society and policeman to the uninitiated.”3 
Judith Walzer Leavitt expands on this premise, highlighting that the actions taken by public 
health authorities could impinge on the political freedoms of their constituents, especially 
in cases such as vaccination which directly impacted their bodies.4 Similarly, Michael 
Willrich argues that in the late nineteenth century, “public health was still an explicitly 
coercive form of social regulation, or ‘police power.’”5 I aim to add to these analyses by 
delineating two forms of power available to public health officials in accomplishing their 
aims: soft and hard power. In military usage, soft power refers to the persuasion of one’s 
enemies, while hard power refers to the use or threat of military force.6 In terms of soft 
power, officials like Joseph McCormack and his fellows on the State Board of Health could 
use health bulletins and newspaper editorials to persuade the public of the necessity of 
health measures. Hard power measures included the passage of public health laws, 
quarantines, vaccination, and the destruction of property in service of the public health. 
 There are many excellent studies of public health in the United States. However, 
most tend to focus on urban areas due to their population density, diversity, and status as 
major commercial centers; or address the country as a whole.7 One notable exception is 
 
3 Barbara Rosenkrantz, Public Health and the State: Changing Views in Massachusetts, 1842-1936 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 31. 
4 Judith Walzer Leavitt, The Healthiest City: Milwaukee and the Politics of Health Reform (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 104. 
5 Michael Willrich, Pox: An American History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 77. 
6 Colin S. Gray, “Summary,” in Hard Power and Soft Power: The Use of Military Force as an Instrument of 
Policy in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), v. 
7 For studies of public health in cities, see Charles Rosenberg, The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 
1849, and 1866 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Leavitt; Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: 
Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Keith 
Wailoo, Dying in the City of the Blues: Sickle Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race and Health (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Samuel Kelton Roberts Jr., Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease and 
the Health Effects of Segregation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2009); David France, How to 
Survive a Plague: The Story of How Activists and Scientists Tamed AIDS (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2016). For histories of public health in the United States, see John C. Burnham’s Health Care in America: A 
History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); W. Michael Byrd and Linda A. Clayton, An 
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Barbara Rosenkrantz’s 1996 study of the creation of Massachusetts’s State Board of 
Health, which, beginning in 1869, was the first in the country.8 However, as we will see, 
that Board of Health was better planned and resourced than Kentucky’s, although the latter 
was established nine years later.9 Kentucky was a rural state with limited resources and the 
State Board of Health found it necessary to accomplish its goals with little institutional 
support.  
While this study examines the work of the Kentucky State Board of Health as a 
whole, it will focus on Dr. Joseph McCormack’s work as its Secretary, as he served for 
over thirty years and was the driving force behind its policies. Over the course of 
McCormack’s tenure as secretary, the board’s work to protect the public health was limited 
by a paltry annual appropriation which rose gradually, beginning in 1878 at $2,500, rising 
to $5,000 in 1900, and was raised to $30,000 at the beginning of 1911.10 At the same time, 
it faced opposition from both fiscal officials in the government and large portions of its 
populace which refused to be vaccinated. The board’s journey to effectiveness involved 
 
American Health Dilemma: A Medical History of African Americans and the Problem of Race, Beginnings 
to 1900 (New York: Routledge, 2000) and An American Health Dilemma: Race, Medicine and Health Care 
in the United States, 1900-2000 (New York: Routledge, 2002); Martin V. Melosi, The Sanitary City: Urban 
Infrastructure in America from Colonial Times to the Present (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and 
the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982).  
8 Rosenkrantz, 55. 
9 Rosenkrantz, 1, 55; “Acts 1878, Chapter 494, Page 59,” in Material Pertaining to the History of the State 
Board of Health of Kentucky, March 16, 1878, McCormack, Record Group 131, Box 16, KY State Board of 
Health: Folder McCormack, Material Pertaining to State Board of Health of Kentucky, Ky State Board of 
Health, Kornhauser Health Sciences Library Historical Collections, University of Louisville, 1; “Dr. Joseph 
N. McCormack,” Biographical Sketches of Doctors of Kentucky by Counties, by Woman’s Auxiliary, 
Kentucky Medical Society, Filson Club, July 1936, 9. 
10 State Board of Health of Kentucky, “Table of Appropriations for Public Health by State,” Biennial Report 
of the State Board of Health of Kentucky, with Laws, Rules, and Regulations: 1898-99 (Louisville, Ky.: 
Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 1899), 19-20; “Probers Rile Dr. McCormack,” The Courier-Journal 
(Louisville, KY), January 25, 1912; State Board of Health of Kentucky, Biennial Report of the State Board 
of Health of Kentucky, 1900-1901 (Louisville, Ky.: Geo. G. Fetter Printing Co., 1901), 13; State Board of 
Health of Kentucky, Biennial Report of the State Board of Health of Kentucky, 1910-1911, 7, 89. 
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attempting to use a combination of hard and soft power measures to convince and coerce 
Kentucky’s citizens into compliance while fighting to expand its access to the resources 
necessary to achieve its public health goals. 
The first chapter of this thesis will examine the period from 1878 to the end of 1899, 
in which the board had $2,500 to spend on all public health measures annually. It will cover 
the board’s early attempts at communicating the necessity for public health measures to 
Kentucky’s citizens, the public health legislation it passed in this era, with mixed success, 
and finally the hard power measures it used to cope with yellow fever and smallpox 
epidemics. The second chapter highlights the board’s evolving strategies to combat 
illnesses in the state from 1900 to the end of 1910, using its increased resources under the 
$5,000 appropriation, the experience gained from successive epidemics of smallpox, and 
new scientific information on the spread of yellow fever to combat diseases directly and to 
educate the public on how to prevent them. The third and final chapter covers the short 
period from 1911 to the end of McCormack’s tenure as secretary, in which the board was 
able to use its new $30,000 operation to vastly expand its programs, which it used to create 
a department of vital statistics, a department of sanitary engineering, and a department of 
bacteriology. These allowed the board to gather crucial information to create better targeted 
programs and diagnose diseases more accurately, finally approaching the scope of their 
original mission to prevent diseases in the state. This increased appropriation, however, 
drew scrutiny from the state legislature, which accused but eventually exonerated Dr. 
McCormack of operating a political machine using the state’s medical societies. Over the 
course of McCormack’s tenure as its secretary, the Kentucky State Board of Health built a 
strong public health infrastructure while operating with limited funding and facing 
5 
 
opposition from fiscal officials and members of the public. Their experience demonstrates 
that while hard power measures can be expedient in protecting the public health, a 
sustainable public health infrastructure also requires adequate funding and the soft power 
use of effective communication to gain the cooperation of the public in order to prevent 







































CHAPTER 2. EARLY PUBLIC HEALTH STRATEGIES, OR MAKING DO ON $2,500 
PER YEAR 
Dr. Joseph McCormack made his career in a dynamic period of American medicine, in 
which both the science available to physicians and the public’s attitude towards them was 
changing. Barbara Rosenkrantz notes that the medical profession had a poor reputation 
dating from earlier eras, as medical education was not standardized, allowing many strains 
of nonorthodox practitioners to operate with impunity.11 She argues that in the early 
nineteenth century, “Physicians did not yet… enjoy an esteem that would have permitted 
them a decisive role in either the prevention or treatment of disease.”12 Rather than relying 
on medical advice, the public believed that the best defense against illness was to maintain 
a physically and morally upstanding life and to remove filth from their environment as far 
as possible.13  
 In the late nineteenth century, these attitudes began to change. Scientific discoveries 
imported from Britain and Europe allowed American physicians to diagnose diseases 
which had previously resisted treatment. Nancy Tomes argues in her Gospel of Germs that 
during the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the new science of germ theory 
benefited from earlier theories of sanitary science, so that hygiene and sanitation were 
emphasized in order to promote a healthier populace and were more fully embraced by the 
public.14 Public health historian George Rosen credits German scientist Jacob Henle with 
developing the germ theory of disease, which gained support from his student Robert 
 
11 Rosenkrantz, 12. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, 13. 
14 Nancy Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 46. 
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Koch’s work to prove Henle’s postulates, as well as from Louis Pasteur’s 1868 
achievement in controlling diseases plaguing the French silkworm industry.15 Following 
Pasteur’s work, the Scottish surgeon Joseph Lister applied the lessons of germ theory to 
surgery by sterilizing wounds with carbolic acid in order to prevent inflammation.16 These 
techniques were quickly adopted by American surgeons, who began to sterilize not only 
wounds, but surgical instruments, operating room staff, and their clothing with heat and 
antiseptic chemicals.17 By the 1880s, most medical journals assumed that their audience 
would be familiar with the germ theory of disease.18 Over the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, the ability to accurately diagnose and treat diseases gave physicians enough 
credibility to earn the public’s trust. 
Kentucky’s State Board of Health was one of the earliest in the country, established 
in 1878 under the tenure of Governor James B. McCreary, a former Confederate from 
Madison County.19 Kentucky’s Legislature created the State Board of Health in response 
to an epidemic of yellow fever, and in 1879 Governor Luke P. Blackburn appointed Dr. 
McCormack as a member.20 He served on the board for thirty-three years, playing a pivotal 
role throughout.21 His experience as a physician building Kentucky’s public health system 
allows us to witness the specific challenges facing rural public health officials. The 
establishment of the Kentucky’s board took place only nine years after Massachusetts’s 
 
15 George Rosen, A History of Public Health (New York: MD Publications, Inc., 1958), 299, 308. 
16 Burnham, 147. 
17 Ibid, 150. 
18 Ibid, 162. 
19 Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1997), 259, 257; “Acts 1878, Chapter 494, Page 59,” in Material Pertaining to the History of the 
State Board of Health of Kentucky, March 16, 1878, McCormack, Record Group 131, Box 16, KY State 
Board of Health: Folder McCormack, Material Pertaining to State Board of Health of Kentucky, Ky State 
Board of Health, 1. 
20 McMurtry, 2. 
21 “Dr. J.N. McCormack, 45 Years on State Health Board Dies,” 4, 6. 
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board, which, according to Rosenkrantz, was “the first in the United States to be based on 
a comprehensive program to prevent unnecessary mortality from all causes.”22 In contrast 
to Massachusetts’s comprehensive program, the members of the Kentucky State Board of 
Health was tasked with achieving ambitious goals which they were expected to accomplish 
using limited funds.23 In the Middlesboro smallpox epidemic of 1898, as well as epidemics 
across the state, this scarce funding inhibited the board’s ability to respond effectively to 
epidemic disease. 
The law establishing the State Board of Health gave its members several duties. In 
addition to being responsible for “the general supervision of the interests of the health and 
life of the citizens of this State,” they were to use the vital statistics of the state to make 
intelligent decisions for the people on health matters as well as investigating the causes of 
diseases and the effects of the environment on Kentuckians.24 They were also expected to 
advise the government on how to keep public buildings healthy and well-ventilated, and 
recommend works of hygiene for state schools.25 Despite these expansive duties, for the 
first twenty-two years of its existence, the state of Kentucky gave the Board just $2,500 to 
pay the Secretary’s salary of one hundred dollars a month, as well as the office space, 
supplies, and travel expenses of the Board.26 McCormack complained about this parsimony 
frequently during his tenure, especially in years marked by costly epidemics.27 
 
22 McMurtry, 2; State Board of Health of Massachusetts, State Board of Health of Massachusetts: A Brief 
History of the Organization and Its Work, 1869-1912 (Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1912), 1; 
Rosenkrantz, 1. 
23 “Acts 1878, Chapter 494, Page 59,” 1; “Dr. Joseph N. McCormack,” 9. 
24 “Acts 1878, Chapter 494, Page 59,” 1. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “Probers Rile Dr. McCormack,” The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), January 25, 1912. 
27 “Acts 1878, Chapter 494, Page 59,” 1. 
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When the board was established, Kentuckians were beset by cholera, yellow fever, 
typhoid, and smallpox. There were few sanitary measures present in the state, medical 
education was unregulated, and the alleged medicines available frequently had no effect or 
spurred addiction through their incorporation of cocaine, morphine, and opium.28 When 
Governor Luke Blackburn was elected in 1879, as a doctor himself, he heartily endorsed 
the Board’s mission.29 In his first address to the Legislature, he explained that the state had 
been untouched by disease for so long that many of its citizens believed that it was 
immune.30 This assumption, he emphasized, was incorrect. He referenced the epidemics of 
1875 and ‘78, lamenting that the previous governor had been unable to act in response to 
these plagues due to the lack of legislation allowing him to appropriate “four or five 
thousand dollars” to establish a quarantine. If he had been able to do so, Blackburn said, 
“hundreds of lives and tens of thousands of dollars would have been saved.”31 The 
establishment of a Board of Health in Kentucky was essential to ameliorate these threats, 
yet for many years the board continued to face the problem of limited funding which 
Blackburn had critiqued.  
Blackburn appointed McCormack to the State Board of Health on the same day he 
gave this address, and four years later, in 1883, McCormack’s fellows on the State Board 
of Health elected him their Secretary for the first time.32 While J. M. Mathews was the 
 
28 Ibid. 
29 Harrison and Klotter, 259. 
30 Luke P. Blackburn, “State Board of Health,” in Governor Luke Blackburn Executive Journal Total, 
December 31, 1879, Kentucky State Digital Archives, accessed April 2, 2020, 
https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_c599c892-3233-4e55-9bcd-0b9f08b2f928/, 166. 
31 Blackburn, 166. He was likely referring to epidemics of yellow fever, but did not specify in his address. 
32 Luke P. Blackburn, “Officers of State and Miscellaneous,” Governor Luke Blackburn - Index to 
Executive Journal, 1879-1883, accessed April 2, 2020, 
https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_0b49b4bc-8562-4673-b4af-a41c1742e792/, 56; 
“Probers Rile Dr. McCormack.” 
10 
 
President of the Board, this was primarily a political appointment. In practice Secretary 
McCormack became responsible for the board’s policies and methods of enforcement, 
particularly in terms of education, legislation, and containing epidemic disease.33 Soon 
after his election as Secretary, McCormack wrote a treatise entitled “Powers and Duties of 
Local Boards of Health,” which gave a good indication of his views on how public health 
should be administered. He wrote that “Under our present laws the powers of health boards 
in making and enforcing regulations for the public health and safety are practically 
unlimited... their authority in some respects being greater than that of any other body 
known to law.” Hard power authority allowed them to enter buildings by force, destroy 
property, order people to self-isolate, and “enforce any regulation which may be necessary 
to prevent the spread of disease and secure the public safety.” These capacities would be 
combined with soft power measures, as McCormack advised that education on sanitary 
practices should be used to persuade the public of their necessity. That is, “The daily press, 
the pulpit, and every other legitimate means should be used to inform the public and to 
impress them that sanitation is a benevolent work of our profession, undertaken solely for 
the general good.” The enforcement powers of local boards were expansive, but 
McCormack believed their use could be avoided if the population supported the measures 
and were active in reporting sanitary violations. He saw the State Board of Health primarily 
as a facilitator, which could be “easily dispensed with or used only as a center of 
communication if a model board existed in each city and county.” However, a model board 
was not always available, as McCormack would discover when he confronted smallpox 
epidemics throughout Kentucky. In many cases, especially in such epidemics, it would 
 
33 This is apparent in the fact that McCormack composed every report on the activities of the State Board of 
Health, while Mathews’s name appears only occasionally in such documents. 
11 
 
prove necessary to use the powers of the state government to combat the spread of illnesses 
across the state.34 
2.1 Early Public Health Communication 
 
Health education served the vital function of informing the public about the most current 
understandings of disease, both as a preventive measure and one which might save lives 
during an epidemic. However, as historian Michael Willrich notes, it was often disregarded 
or refused by a population which did not necessarily trust their government, whether this 
government was local, state, or federal. Willrich argues that in this era, “public health was 
still an explicitly coercive form of social regulation, or “police power.””35 At least some of 
the people who opposed public health legislation understood it as such, although 
McCormack contended that the use of power in the service of public health was justified 
by its ability to save lives.36 
 Preventive education often took the form of a booklet or pamphlet to be distributed 
to the populace. For instance, in “Soil Drainage as a Health Measure,” McCormack not 
only advised his readers on the best places to build a house, namely on the south or 
southwest slope of a farm, but railed against the attention given to certain diseases when 
 
34 J. N. McCormack, “Powers and Duties of Local Boards of Health,” American Practitioner 27, no. 5, 
(1883), McCormack, Joseph N., Record Group 127, WPA Research Material – Medicine in Kentucky, 
Kornhauser Health Sciences Library Historical Collections, University of Louisville, 269-70, 271, 269. 
35 Michael Willrich, Pox: An American History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 77. 
36 J. N. McCormack, “Secretary McCormack, of the State Board of Health, writes a Bad-tempered Letter on 
the Legislation wanted. Apparently Harmless Bills,” in the Louisville Courier-Journal, April 14, 1884, 
McCormack, Joseph N., Record Group 127, WPA Research Material – Medicine in Kentucky, Kornhauser 
Health Sciences Library Historical Collections, University of Louisville, 2. 
12 
 
far more people were killed each year by less charismatic maladies.37 He argued that 
preventive medicine was far more effective than trying to cure diseases after the fact.38 In 
his history of the disease in the United States, The Cholera Years, Charles Rosenberg 
asserted that while far more people died of diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, 
cholera was “novel and terrifying, a crisis demanding response in every area of American 
life and thought.”39 This was also true of yellow fever and smallpox, two epidemics which 
McCormack later faced. Although they killed fewer people than routine diseases, their 
symptoms were terrifying enough to inspire panic at the prospect of contracting them. 
 When challenged on his medical authority and faced with what he perceived as 
ignorance, McCormack could be harsh. One of the articles published upon his death in the 
Louisville Times gave the opinion that while he was generally courteous and friendly, it 
was also possible for him to “smile while sinking the steel deep into an adversary who 
stood in his way.”40 This tendency is apparent in his reply to a man identified only as “Mr. 
Marcum,” who apparently denied the efficacy of vaccination after the events of a recent 
epidemic of smallpox, likely the one which spread throughout Kentucky’s mountain 
counties in 1898.41 McCormack explained to Marcum that “Kentucky has had 11,338 cases 
of smallpox during the present epidemic, with 166 deaths. There have been reported 
 
37 J. N. McCormack, “Soil Drainage as a Health Measure,” State Board of Health, 1881, Record Group 104, 
Eugene H. Conner, MD Papers, Kornhauser Health Sciences Library Historical Collections, University of 
Louisville, 14-15. 
38 Ibid, 3. 
39 Rosenberg, 4. 
40 Keltenbacher, 3. 
41 J. N. McCormack, “A Voice from the State Board of Health--Dr. Browne on Smallpox,” in the Jackson 
Hustler, December 17, 1901, from the research of Margaret F. Bishop for “J.N. McCormack, M.D., 
Autobiography,” McCormack, Jos. N AT WPA-Bio-Ser.2, Kornhauser Health Sciences Library Historical 
Collections, University of Louisville, 1. I have been unable to find Marcum’s original letter from the Jackson 
Hustler, so McCormack’s voice is all that is available as a source in this dispute. 
13 
 
815,926 vaccinations without a single death, loss of limb, or even serious sickness.”42 He 
defended the work and character of three Breathitt County health officials who Marcum 
had maligned, and perhaps the attacks on his colleagues provoked his cutting reply. After 
laying out the relevant statistics on smallpox, McCormack wrote of Marcum that he “ought 
to be ashamed of himself,” but that “Many good men make mistakes in times of excitement, 
and smallpox times are always exciting. But if Mr. Marcum is a real manly man, which no 
doubt he is, he will apologize to the community and especially to the Board of Health, and 
at once have the one he abused the most to vaccinate in three places on his arm.”43 There 
is no way to know Marcum’s reaction for certain, but it is reasonable to assume that this 
reply from the preeminent health official in the state exposed him to the ridicule of his 
community. 
 In another, more serious instance, McCormack wrote what the newspaper described 
as a “Bad-tempered Letter” to a constituent who had been haranguing the Legislature for 
some time to stop passing bills related to the State Board of Health.44 He castigated the 
man for writing editorials on a subject that he knew nothing about, and informed him that 
“Prating about the rights of man in this connection may be well enough for idle dreamers 
and sentimentalists, but [not] in this practical age, when we know that each case of 
preventable disease and death, to say nothing of the suffering and sorrow it occasions, 
represents the loss of so much of the capitalized wealth of the State.”45 He considered it 
his duty to protect the health of the state, and had little patience for people who feared that 
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the powers the Board was given went too far. Nonetheless, upon learning that this man 
objected, the Board held hearings to gauge public opposition, and found that after hearing 
the facts of the case, they were “[endorsed] without a dissenting voice.”46 This episode 
demonstrates that by letting the public air their grievances and explaining the reasons 
behind the board’s actions, they could gain more support than by dismissing them as 
ignorant. 
2.2 Early Public Health Legislation 
 
Beyond his communications with the public, Dr. McCormack’s reach and priorities can be 
seen most clearly through the legislation he wrote and lobbied to pass. However, the fact 
that a law passed and was listed in the state’s statutes did not necessarily mean that it was 
effective or enforced. McCormack recognized that some counties in Kentucky opposed the 
State Board of Health and its imposition of authority through the creation of local boards 
of health.47 He explained that “Much has been said and will be said about the need of new 
legislation and increased powers, but the difficulty in this States so far has been that the 
laws already in existence have not been enforced, and the powers already granted have not 
be exercised.”48 In fact, he added, there were a number of counties which had not even 
attempted to organize a local board of health.49 McCormack often lobbied lawmakers 
personally on health issues, and was considered a convincing speaker. One of his 
contemporaries remarked that “He often said that the only means he ever used to gain his 
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point [with legislators] was persuasion for, not using either whiskey or tobacco, he could 
offer neither one to pave his way to their good will.”50 While in many cases it was possible 
to convince the legislature of a bill’s necessity by appealing to them personally or directing 
their constituents and especially physicians to contact them on the matter, this did not 
automatically translate to its acceptance by counties and citizens who were distant from the 
centers of power. 
 One of McCormack’s newspaper eulogizers credited him with an impressive list of 
legislative achievements. He noted that Dr. McCormack had written: 
The present State Health Law, passed in 1883, the law of 1885 for the 
prevention of livestock disease; the Medical Practice Law of 1888; the law 
licensing oste[o]paths in 1898; the one requiring the examining of 
applicants to practice medicine, passed in 1904; the law of 1892 relicensing 
all doctors in the state to eliminate quacks “The Vital Statistics Law in 1908, 
and the law passed in 1918 consolidating all agencies having to do with 
public health.51 
 
Although these laws represent the culmination not only of McCormack’s but many other 
health reformers’ ambitions, their practical effect was mixed.52 The State Health Law 
referenced above was temporarily withdrawn before passing in 1883, as it was endangered 
by resistance to a law which aimed to create a State Board of Medical Examiners at the 
behest of the Hart County Medico Chirurgical Society in order to set an examination for 
every person who wished to practice medicine in Kentucky.53 The latter type of measures 
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met resistance from practitioners outside the medical establishment such as Thomsonians, 
who practiced botanic medicine, and homeopaths, who diluted natural substances to treat 
disease.54 These were practitioners who McCormack and his fellow physicians would have 
considered “quacks.” McCormack himself noted that when the Board had found that “most 
of the medical colleges of Louisville, which had never been known to agree on anything 
before, and two of which had spent the past winter in the usual annual attempt to blacken 
each other’s character, had actually pooled their issues to fight this bill, for fear it would 
exclude them, we at once withdrew it rather than endanger our Health Bill.”55 In cases such 
as this one, the Board was unpopular because it threatened the livelihoods of physicians 
and instructors who would have preferred to practice their craft without the Board’s 
oversight. 
Even though the State Health Law had eventually passed, Dr. James W. Holland of 
Louisville noted in 1885 that “The law on the statute-books in 1883 is still in force. In all 
but two or three out of a hundred counties it is a dead letter. The State Board of Health 
made an attempt to get a better law through last winter; it was defeated by prejudice excited 
by some Louisville medical schools. They will try again at the next Legislature, two years 
hence.”56 Simply getting a law passed was not enough to ensure that it was effective. In 
many cases, it was necessary to have it enforced. 
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2.3 Preventing Yellow Fever in 1897 
 
Beyond health communication and legislation, the board frequently had to face epidemic 
crises which necessitated the use of hard power measures to bring them under control, as 
it did during the yellow fever epidemic of 1897. Yellow fever is a virus spread by the 
mosquito Aedes aegypti and is endemic to tropical areas in Africa as well as Central and 
South America. It is most lethal in areas where there is a high density of mosquitoes and a 
low incidence of vaccination.57 Before 1900, when Walter Reed, United States Army 
Surgeon, demonstrated that mosquitoes were crucial to spreading the disease, there was 
little understanding of its movements, which complicated public health responses.58 The 
vaccine was not invented until 1937, and its discoverer, Max Theiler, received a Nobel 
Prize for his achievement.59 There is still no cure.60 
Many people who contract yellow fever do not experience symptoms, which makes 
it more challenging to identify. Those who do have symptoms often experience fever, 
muscle pain, backache, headache, loss of appetite, and vomiting. A smaller number of 
patients have more serious symptoms. These include high fevers and kidney and liver 
malfunctions. It is during this toxic stage that many patients develop jaundice, a yellowing 
of the eyes and skin which gives the disease its name. Patients may also experience 
bleeding from the eyes, nose, mouth, or stomach. According to the World Health 
Organization, half of the patients who reach this stage die within ten days.61 At the turn of 
 
57 “Yellow Fever,” World Health Organization. 
58 Walter Reed, Jas. Carroll and Aristides Agramonte, “The Etiology of Yellow Fever: An Additional Note,” 
Sanitary Department Havana-Cuba, Series 3¸ 1901, 18. 
59 Erling Norrby, “Yellow Fever and Max Theiler: the only Nobel Prize for a virus vaccine,” Journal of 
Experimental Medicine 204 no. 12 (2007), accessed April 10, 2020, 10.1084/jem.20072290. 




the nineteenth century, without a good understanding of its spread and forty years before 
the advent of the vaccine, yellow fever inspired fear among Kentuckians and provoked a 
rapid response from the State Board of Health. 
In August 1897, yellow fever spread from its first appearance in Ocean Springs, 
Mississippi to Southern cities such as Mobile, New Orleans, and Jackson. To prevent it 
from being introduced into Kentucky, the board sent inspectors to all trains from infected 
areas to curb the spread. According to their records, the inspectors were placed on “all 
trains from the infected districts in time to meet and examine the first refugees coming into 
the state,” within forty-eight hours of hearing about the epidemic.62 They used the best 
methods that were available at the time, moving all potentially contaminated baggage and 
belongings to a separate car, where they were disinfected with formaldehyde gas. More 
importantly, the inspectors questioned each person from an infected area, gathering their 
names and destinations and forwarding these to the local health authorities there, enabling 
an early form of contact tracing. Each person who was questioned promised to notify the 
local authorities if they changed their destination or address in Kentucky.63 
 In this case, where the Board was able to preempt the entry of yellow fever into the 
state, the inspectors were instructed to offer “uniform kindness and courtesy” to “every 
person fleeing from pestilence coming to our borders.”64 McCormack alleged that this was 
in contrast to the methods of some neighboring states, as “the Board believes, after nineteen 
years’ experience in this work, that an intelligent inspection service of this kind gives 
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greater security to our people than the harsh and inhuman prohibitions of some of our 
neighbors.”65 Despite this claim of inhumanity, Tennessee’s yellow fever regulations for 
railroads that year were much like Kentucky’s, showing that that state at least was taking 
safe and humane precautions against the disease.66 Indiana’s inspection service was 
similar, except that the inspector was empowered to remove people suffering from yellow 
fever to a hospital barge for treatment or observation, and perhaps McCormack objected to 
this provision as less humane than the service his board operated.67 As the other states did, 
Kentucky’s board opposed the use of quarantines except as a last resort, noting that they 
were detrimental to business interests in the entirety of the South during the epidemic.68 
Nonetheless, they acknowledged that in the future such measures might be necessary. As 
a result of their inspection and disinfection work, this epidemic’s effect in Kentucky was 
minimal. There were only three cases of yellow fever among the refugees the state 
admitted, and according to their information not one citizen of Kentucky was infected.69 
 In the case of the 1897 yellow fever epidemic, Kentucky’s health authorities were 
able to respond successfully for three main reasons. First, they had enough warning of the 
epidemic’s spread into Kentucky to quickly set up quarantines and prepare an inspection 
service. Second, in most cases they received the prompt and cheerful cooperation of the 
train services whose aid was necessary to carry out their work of disinfection and contact 
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tracing. Finally, as their work in this case dealt primarily with transportation coming into 
the state, the board was able to carry out its work without interference from either local or 
federal governments. This would not be the case during Middlesboro’s smallpox epidemic. 
2.4 Containing Smallpox 
 
In 1788, James Madison argued that through the federalist system the federal government 
and the states would “control each other, at the same time each will be controlled by itself,” 
redoubling the security of the people’s rights.70 However, the protection of public health 
in emergencies necessitates broad powers and quick action. These measures are often 
unpopular and viewed as anti-democratic, yet they are vital to save lives.71 The 1897-8 
smallpox epidemic in Middlesboro, Kentucky, demonstrates how the conflict between 
federal, state, and local public health powers delayed the steps which could have contained 
the epidemic, and put public health exigencies in conflict with American federalist 
principles. 
 Under the Commonwealth’s laws at the time, county courts were responsible for 
funding the response to epidemic disease.72 As Alexis de Tocqueville notes in Democracy 
in America, in the nineteenth century Americans expressed a preference for local authority 
to the point, as in this case, where it could be a disadvantage.73 Although the epidemic was 
serious when the Kentucky Board of Health arrived at Jellico, a nearby county which was 
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infected soon after Middlesboro, that county was able to secure its own funding and bring 
the disease under control.74 Middlesboro, at least initially, was not able to raise the funds.75 
In counties throughout the state, the availability of local funding was a major factor 
determining whether health authorities were able to respond effectively to the threat of 
smallpox. 
 Smallpox, or Variola major, had historically been one of the most gruesome threats 
known to humanity. In her account of the smallpox epidemic of 1775-82, Elizabeth Fenn 
describes the horror of this disease in detail. It began with flu-like symptoms, including 
headaches, backaches, fever and vomiting. After these symptoms disappeared, smallpox 
would spread around the body, starting with the nose and mouth. Over the course of the 
fourth day, smallpox “extends itself from the mucous membranes to the surface of the skin. 
On some, it turns inward, hemorrhaging subcutaneously… In most cases, however, the rash 
turns outward, covering the victim in raised pustules that concentrate in precisely the places 
where they will cause the most physical pain and psychological anguish: the soles of the 
feet, the palms of the hands,” and the “face, forearms, neck and back.” 76 Even if a victim 
survived the disease, smallpox could be disfiguring. 
However, by the 1890s, the rise of a less serious variant known as Variola minor 
decreased the threat that smallpox posed.77 Over the five years from 1898-1903, this variant 
is believed to have killed only 5,627 people in comparison to the 50,000 who might have 
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died from Variola major.78 One of the hard power measures afforded to the State Board of 
Health and to local boards of health was to vaccinate citizens against infectious disease.79 
McCormack believed that the widespread neglect of vaccination had been “more due to 
indifference than ignorance.”80 Nonetheless, there were valid reasons for Middlesboro’s 
residents to refuse vaccination. Leavitt notes that if the “humanized” smallpox virus were 
used, it could infect people with other diseases. If transmitted through too many people, it 
lost its power to confer immunity. Vaccines made from bovine matter, if kept too long, 
were minimally effective. Additionally, some vaccinators used a single vaccine point for 
many people and failed to clean it.81 Finally, with the rise of the milder Variola minor, 
many people preferred the risk of remaining unvaccinated to the vaccine’s side effects, 
which included “rashes, fatigue, headache, fever,” and “painfully tender arms.”82 These 
were potentially serious concerns for manual laborers who could not afford to miss even a 
week of work. 
The milder variant of smallpox came to Alabama from Central America early in 
1897 and spread north to Kentucky by December.83 Middlesboro was the first city in 
Kentucky to be infected, as it was located at the border of Tennessee and Virginia. This 
made it vulnerable to migrants traveling from other states. The town had been founded only 
ten years prior to the epidemic by a Canadian businessman named Alexander Arthur, who 
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partnered with British investors to extract the area’s plentiful coal.84 While these investors 
had projected a wildly successful business venture, the flow of capital disappeared within 
three years due to a fire that destroyed the business district in the spring of 1890.85 
Rebuilding the district bankrupted Arthur’s company, and the town was further 
impoverished by job losses and bank failures during the financial panic of 1893.86 By 
November 1897 when an African American miner named Scott traveled to Middlesboro 
from Birmingham, Alabama, the local government had no resources to contain the 
smallpox microbe he carried.87 
 In addition to the risks posed by its financial insolvency, Middlesboro, like many 
southern cities, was highly segregated, with its Black population concentrated in “Alabama 
Row” and the “Over the Rhine” district, the latter of which was located across the Yellow 
Creek from the main town.88 Historian Samuel Roberts notes that “many public health 
researchers have determined segregation to be a fundamental cause of illness, even if 
historians of Jim Crow have not included health deficits in full account of the wages of 
segregation.”89 The relative invisibility imposed on Middlesboro’s Black residents by 
white segregationists meant that the city’s health officials were not aware of smallpox in 
their midst until far too late. In addition, historian Jim Downs argues that the federal 
government neglected the health needs of Black Americans both during and after the Civil 
War, with the medical arm of the Freedmen’s Bureau predicating care on their ability to 
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work.90 With this legacy of institutional neglect, the Black inhabitants of Middlesboro were 
never likely to receive sufficient medical care for their needs. 
 The danger posed by segregation was not lost on McCormack, who attributed the 
delay in recognizing smallpox to “the mild character of the disease, and to the fact that it 
was confined to negroes during all the early part of the epidemic.”91 In response to this 
perceived threat from the county’s Black population, McCormack issued a statewide 
recommendation that towns and cities “at once pass and enforce a compulsory vaccination 
ordinance, beginning with the colored race… that visiting and strange negroes be hunted 
out, vaccinated and kept under observation.”92 Disregarding, the violence inherent in this 
order, McCormack also directed that “Those having this work in hand should deal firmly, 
but kindly, with every one, advising that this work is being done for their protection as well 
as that of the community.”93 He clearly recognized the importance of treating smallpox 
patients gently in order to secure their cooperation, but racism seems to have blinded him 
to the incompatibility of this practice when Black patients were being captured and held 
against their will. Roberts argues that the environments in which Black victims of disease 
found themselves were often regarded as cultural by health officials, and that “Given the 
political heritage of the racial ideal, blacks could not easily counter the stigmas of 
shiftlessness, defiance of sanitary and medical authority, and poor hygienic and dietary 
habits.”94 Considering the era, McCormack likely concurred with other white health 
 
90 Jim Downs, Sick from Freedom: African-American Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 92-3. 
91 McCormack, “Report of the Secretary,” 28. 
92 J. M. Mathews and J. N. McCormack, “Warning Against Smallpox,” March 25, 1898, in the Biennial 
Report of the State Board of Health of Kentucky, with Laws, Rules, and Regulations: 1898-99 (1899), 23. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Roberts, 66. 
25 
 
officials that Middlesboro’s Black victims of smallpox were to blame for their own 
suffering. 
McCormack, for his part, blamed the Bell County board of health for the 
“parsimony and incapacity of the city and county officials,” who delayed containment 
measures and laid the foundation for an epidemic.95 By March 10 of 1898, almost a month 
after McCormack and his aides had been notified of the outbreak, the citizens of 
Middlesboro were out of patience with the State Board of Health. Although Middlesboro 
was required by law to pay to mitigate epidemics, the town did not have the money. The 
State Board of Health, limited in its own resources, had refused to contribute any funds. 
Secretary McCormack had wired Middlesboro Mayor J. G. Fitzpatrick that “Unless city or 
county can arrange [the money], will be forced to release you and local Board from duty, 
stop all trains and advise adjoining counties to protect themselves.”96 As the State Board 
of Health had limited its functions to quarantining the county, Fitzpatrick sent a telegram 
to the Surgeon-General of the United States. He, along with David. G. Colson of the 
Kentucky House of Representatives and W. P. Brownlow of the First District of Tennessee 
wanted the federal government to become involved. 
Surgeon-General Walter Wyman was head of the United States Marine Hospital 
Service, which was at this time the closest the country had to a national public health 
organization. Founded in 1798 to care for sick and disabled seamen, its purview had slowly 
expanded.97 With the Quarantine Act of 1878 it gained the right to quarantine the nation’s 
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ports.98 This authority was briefly superseded by the National Board of Health after 1879, 
but that organization failed to secure continuing funding and became defunct in 1883, at 
which time the Marine Hospital Service resumed its surveillance and quarantine 
activities.99 The National Board of Health had failed partially because some states objected 
to the aggressiveness of its quarantine activities, protesting that their rights were being 
trampled by the national government.100 This tension between state and federal public 
health authorities remained current through the end of the nineteenth century and beyond. 
Historian of the Marine Hospital Service Fitzhugh Mullan argues that “Although the Law 
of 1893 passed the baton of quarantine authority to the federal government, public health 
activity in general remained the domain of the states.”101 Therefore, when his superiors 
called on the Service for help, McCormack was not alone among state health officials in 
resenting their interference.102 
Having received Mayor Fitzpatrick and his allies’ requests for aid, Surgeon-
General Wyman sent his subordinate Passed Assistant Surgeon C. P. Wertenbaker to 
investigate the situation. Upon his arrival in Middlesboro, Wertenbaker reported that out 
of a population of 4,200, there were forty-nine cases of smallpox in the pesthouse and forty-
three suspected, plus 400 quarantined at home.103 The city was quarantined, and Dr. Arthur 
T. McCormack insisted that the State Board could control the epidemic, but that the county 
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should provide the money.104 Wertenbaker concluded that “Under circumstances do not 
see that Service can do anything. I will leave tomorrow, rejoining Wilmington, unless 
otherwise ordered.105 Nonetheless, he demonstrated that the lack of money to fight the 
epidemic was at the root of the problem. The Middlesboro authorities were unable to pay, 
hoping to offload responsibility to the state or the federal government. The State Board of 
Health was happy to retain authority over the epidemic, but also refused to pay, on the 
grounds that this was the county’s responsibility and considering its own lack of funds. 
Finally, the federal government in the guise of the U.S. Marine Hospital Service, was 
reluctant to intervene without the clear authority to do so. 
Wyman vetoed Wertenbaker’s plans to return to Wilmington. On March 14, he 
asked Wertenbaker whether the measures taken to protect the neighboring states of 
Tennessee and Virginia were adequate and ordered him to investigate.106 Through these 
orders, Wyman was likely attempting to determine whether he had the jurisdiction to 
intervene.107 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, United States Constitution allowed the federal 
government to “regulate Commerce… among the several States.”108 In light of this 
provision, the Marine Hospital Service might have the pretext to assume authority if 
smallpox threatened to affect not just Kentucky but surrounding states, as the disease and 
any accompanying quarantine measures could affect the flow of interstate commerce.109 In 
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passed a resolution requesting that the federal government pay for quarantine measures 
extending beyond the boundaries of a single state.110 While this resolution did not have the 
force of law, it signaled that Wyman was less likely to receive objections from state health 
authorities if the Service’s activities encompassed multiple states. 
At this point, Secretary McCormack’s superior officer, Kentucky Board of Health 
President J. M. Mathews telegraphed Wertenbaker that “After consultation with the 
Governor of Kentucky, I authorize Dr. Wertenbaker to take charge, if the Federal 
government will defray expenses. There is no money in our treasury and no law to 
appropriate any for this purpose.”111 This decision must have rankled McCormack. His 
authority had been overruled by the political appointee who left the actual work of running 
the Board to him and made decisions only when it was politically expedient.112 In response, 
he took power into his own hands. Wertenbaker reported that, “A telegram has just been 
received by the chief inspector from McCormack, Secretary of State Board, recalling all 
State Board officers. This will leave the situation absolutely unprotected.”113 Wertenbaker 
had learned that there were fifty-nine cases of smallpox in Tennessee, but that the 
Tennessee Board of Health had them under control. Virginia did not seem to have any 
cases.114 This meant that the pretext for federal intervention was thin. There were no longer 
any authorities willing to take responsibility for preventing the spread of smallpox in 
Middlesboro, or to pay to contain the epidemic. 
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Wyman refused to intervene. He wrote that Wertenbaker had “not been authorized 
to take control... The government’s interest is in protecting other states, and nowhere is the 
whole expense borne by the government. Every municipality should have enough pride in 
itself to suppress this ordinary contagious disease.”115 Wyman, like McCormack, blamed 
Middlesboro for its dire situation. The federal government would not bail them out even in 
their severe state of need. On March 17, Wyman and McCormack decided that the State 
Board and the U. S. Marine Hospital would “aid and co-operate under the [State Board’s] 
regulations,” although “All expenditures must be supervised and accounted for by 
[Wertenbaker], who has been directed to confer with your representative and work in 
harmony.”116 Six days after Wertenbaker’s arrival in Middlesboro, time in which vital 
work could have been accomplished, the state and federal health officers agreed to work 
together to resolve the crisis, with the federal government supplying the necessary funds. 
Wertenbaker’s report of the situation highlights the severity of the circumstances. 
By the end of March 14, the day on which most of the attempts to abdicate responsibility 
took place, there had been 169 confirmed cases of smallpox, 34 among white residents and 
135 in the city’s Black community.117 This disparity reflects the initial vulnerability of the 
Black population and the spread of the disease while it was still concealed from the white 
health officers of the town. Wertenbaker explained that the town had been quarantined 
since February 28th when the State Board of Health arrived.118 Since then, 1,960 people 
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had been vaccinated, and “forcible vaccination [was] still progressing.”119 Evidently, 
Middlesboro’s populace continued to have reservations about vaccination. 
On March 24, Wertenbaker recounted his own work to organize the relief efforts. 
He, on behalf of the federal government, employed five inspectors to continue vaccinating 
the city’s residents and secured a house for use as a hospital.120 They paid a boarding-house 
keeper fifty dollars to move out, fixed the house up to accommodate more people than “a 
cooking stove and twelve chairs” could supply, and “moved into it ninety-one persons from 
the former pesthouse, which was located in a thickly settled part of the city and adjoined 
the detention camp,” making it hard to keep the patients with smallpox and those who were 
suspected to have it apart.121 The Service employed twenty-five guards to secure the 
hospital.122 Wertenbaker’s account demonstrates that the treatments available were limited. 
The hard power measures of vaccination and quarantines were the only real steps they 
could use to stop the spread, and preventing further infection took priority over protecting 
the individual rights of those who contracted smallpox. As a result of the financial impasse, 
having his authority overruled and being forced to cooperate with Wyman, McCormack 
was unable to take control of the situation. 
In the aftermath of the Middlesboro epidemic, McCormack wrote to Surgeon-
General Wyman attempting to “correct a misstatement made in the current number of your 
“Public Health Reports,” to the effect that this Board, the Governor of Kentucky, or any 
one having authority to do so, asked for national aid in suppressing small-pox at 
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Middlesboro.”123 This assertion was manifestly untrue, as the telegrams from the Governor 
and the President of the State Board of Health were included alongside McCormack’s 
earlier correspondence with Wyman in the board’s Biennial Report.124 McCormack 
explained that: 
We hesitated to give you absolute control because of the ineffectual 
methods adopted by your Service in Alabama, which had permitted the 
present epidemic in Tennessee and Kentucky, and of its similar history in 
former years in dealing with yellow fever and small-pox. After our 
inspectors left, your representative found that he had no authority to assume 
charge. Our quarantine was continued in force to protect the balance of the 
state, but no one had charge in Middlesboro for almost a week, and the 
disease made such headway that it has required over a month to bring it 
under control to the same degree as when we left.125 
 
Wyman correctly protested the assertion that no one had asked for the Service’s 
help and directed McCormack to look at the Annual Reports of the Service and Public 
Health Reports to correct his impressions of their management of smallpox and yellow 
fever.126 However, he did not dispute McCormack’s charge that the conflict between the 
state and federal health services, which the Secretary blamed on the latter, had caused an 
unconscionable delay in containing the smallpox epidemic. 
McCormack did not take Wyman’s response to his criticism well. He explained that 
“As you refuse to make the correction, demanded alike by the facts and fair dealing, I will 
be forced to take my own methods of doing so.”127 McCormack then sent a letter to the 
Editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association in Chicago. He complained that 
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the U.S. Marine Hospital Service representative published a report in which he “found the 
methods of this Board inefficient.”128 This insult to their procedures seems to have been 
the real point at issue. McCormack’s final statement on the matter clearly showed his 
objections to the expansion of federal health authority at the expense of the states. In his 
letter to the Editor, he wrote: 
As [Surgeon-General Wyman] has declined to make the correction, and as 
this Bureau is the chief obstacle to the enactment of efficient national 
legislation for the protection of public health interests in the country, I ask 
that the subjoined correspondence be given a place in your columns, that 
health officials and the profession may know what to expect at the hands of 
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CHAPTER 3. FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR A NEW CENTURY 
Although the smallpox epidemic in Middlesboro had been contained with the help of the 
Marine Hospital Service, this did not represent the end of Kentucky’s fight against the 
disease. It spread far beyond Middlesboro, with at least one case in forty-nine of the one 
hundred and two counties which had reported their experience with smallpox to the State 
Board of Health in 1898 and 1899.130 Based on these reports, McCormack estimated that 
during that two-year period over 1,500 cases had occurred in the state, costing cities and 
counties $57,000 directly and an estimated $250,000 lost from interference with travel, 
business, and commerce.131 McCormack exhorted his constituents that “the entire epidemic 
was preventable and would have been prevented, had our reiterated admonitions been 
heeded. Vaccination of these communities would have made an epidemic of small-pox an 
impossibility.”132 He later estimated that at the beginning of the epidemic less than thirty 
percent of Kentucky’s population had been vaccinated, and that in some counties the figure 
was less than five percent, providing far less immunity than would be necessary to keep 
the population safe.133 McCormack wrote that “It is also confidently believed that most of 
the expense, to say nothing of the suffering and loss of life, could have been prevented had 
the funds been available for keeping our trained men in the field for the first two or three 
months, tracing out the suspects and exposed persons.”134 This admonition encapsulated 
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two of the main barriers to carrying out the board’s public health goals throughout 
McCormack’s tenure: insufficient funding for their programs to prevent and contain 
disease, and the imperfect cooperation of the people. 
By the end of 1899, the board was in debt, and could only act against the disease 
when the fiscal authorities of the affected counties agreed to pay their way ahead of time. 
In the meantime, smallpox had reached 110 of Kentucky’s 119 counties, which 
McCormack partly blamed on repeated importations from Tennessee, a state which he 
alleged to have taken lax precautions against the disease. With such a dire state of affairs, 
the board “found that its authority to place counties and towns whose authorities failed or 
refused to adopt the proper precautions against the disease [under quarantine] an 
indispensable weapon.” This hard power measure forced fiscal authorities who were 
reluctant to aid their health officials in containing the disease, and who had been using this 
pretense at economy to gain votes, to finally appropriate the necessary funds in order to get 
the quarantine raised. The final exercise of this measure of last resort during that period 
took place in Greenup county, where the fiscal court agreed to support its health officials 
within two days, upon which the quarantine was immediately raised. By the end of its 1900 
legislative session, the Kentucky General Assembly raised the board’s appropriation to 
$5,000, and explicitly attributed this raise to the smallpox emergency in the new law. This 
allowed the board to actively pursue its work against smallpox and other diseases once 
more.135 
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3.1 Eradicating Smallpox 
 
With the renewed agency provided by doubling the board’s appropriation, McCormack 
was instructed to travel around the state and visit infected localities to hold whatever 
meetings necessary and “do everything in his power to arouse the authorities and people to 
the importance of at once ridding the State of this loathsome and expensive malady.”136 
Having reluctantly implemented the hard power measure of quarantining counties, the 
board returned to its preferred strategy of getting McCormack to talk to people directly and 
convince them to accede to its plans.  
In addition to quarantines and Dr. McCormack’s voice, the board had other hard 
power measures available to it under the law. Physicians and families were to report all 
cases of smallpox and other infectious diseases to their county and municipal boards of 
health within twenty-four hours.137 These local boards had the authority to remove people 
infected with smallpox to isolation hospitals, and the county was to pay for all reasonable 
expenses for “hospitals, physicians, nurses, guards, and all necessary supplies in managing 
and stamping out the disease.”138 This last measure was responsible for much of the dispute 
between county health and fiscal authorities. Despite the law, many of the latter were 
unable or unwilling to expend county funds to equip these hospitals, creating dangerous 
delays in stamping out smallpox epidemics when they arose. By August 1, 1901, only 
812,200 people in Kentucky had either been vaccinated or survived a case of smallpox, 
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meaning that 1,334,975 people were still vulnerable to the disease.139 If it wished to truly 
eradicate smallpox in the state, the board would have to vastly expand the number of people 
that it vaccinated and secure the cooperation of fiscal authorities in limiting outbreaks. 
In 1902, having previously used the power only against individual counties, the 
board faced the novel prospect of quarantining Kentucky’s border against an entire state. 
While it had long been wary of the lax methods Tennessee and West Virginia used in 
containing their smallpox epidemics, conditions had improved somewhat in those states 
over the months preceding the board’s annual meeting on May 27, 1902. At this time, they 
were more concerned about their northern border. Indiana had recently exhausted its annual 
appropriation, and smallpox was present in sixty of the state’s ninety-two counties, 
including every county along Kentucky’s border. Furthermore, their Governor refused to 
expend any of the state’s “epidemic fund” to fight the disease. McCormack informed his 
colleagues that “any form of quarantine against the State would involve great difficulties 
and much expense, and would entail serious hardships upon their people as well as many 
of our own, but the conditions there are so serious that it is my duty to set the facts plainly 
before you.” Dr. McCormack had recently visited Indianapolis with his fellow board 
member, Dr. Bailey, hoping to secure a resolution to the situation without resorting to 
quarantine, but they left disappointed, and McCormack presented the board with a letter 
from the Indiana State Board of Health dated three weeks after their visit that they were 
still waiting for a decision from the governor.140 
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Dr. J. N. Hurty of the Indiana State Board of Health, Dr. W. H. Sheets, City Health 
Officer of Jeffersonville, Dr. Robert W. Harris and Dr. C. W. McIntyre of the New Albany 
Board of Health had attended the May 27th meeting in an effort to dissuade the Kentucky 
State Board of Health from setting up a quarantine at the border.141 Dr. Hurty proclaimed 
that “Representing the Indiana State Board of Health, I would say that I am not certain in 
this smallpox epidemic that Indiana is more dangerous to Kentucky than Kentucky is 
dangerous to Indiana.” He recommended that if Kentucky were to vaccinate every one of 
its citizens this would also save the state from the disease. He admitted, however, that 
Indiana’s board was “powerless because of lack of funds,” a situation their Kentucky 
counterpart had also faced three years prior and might therefore have been expected to 
cause them to extend some sympathy. Even though Indiana’s legislature had appropriated 
$50,000 for the suppression of epidemics, the Governor refused to release the funds. Dr. 
Hurty hastened to add that “There is no friction between the State Board of Health and the 
chief executive, merely a difference of opinion. He does not think the situation demands 
his interference. We do.” Despite Hurty’s protestations, it is hard to imagine a situation 
which would call more urgently for the governor’s intervention, especially considering 
Kentucky’s proposed quarantine against the state. Hurty pleaded with the Kentuckians to 
delay their quarantine until they could persuade the governor to act. In response, Dr. 
McCormack asked, somewhat ominously, “if in the opinion of Dr. Hurty an epidemic of 
smallpox could be controlled without the authority of the State board working with money 
behind it?” “No,” his counterpart replied, settling the question.142  
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In consequence, Dr. McCormack’s colleagues instructed him to prepare a 
proclamation of quarantine against Indiana for that evening’s session.143 The proclamation 
announced that smallpox existed in epidemic form in the majority of Indiana’s counties, 
with at least 800 cases, and that people in the counties bordering Kentucky often came into 
the state and spread it to their neighbors. In addition, the health authorities in Indiana had 
not been able to restrict the spread due to lack of support from their fiscal authorities, who 
refused even to allow them the funds specifically appropriated for such an eventuality. 
With this danger to Kentucky’s citizens, the board established the low-water mark on the 
Indiana shore as the boundary line to the quarantine and forbade any person from Indiana 
who did not have a certificate from an authorized health official in Indiana or Kentucky 
from entering the state. Such a certificate would need to certify that the person had been 
successfully vaccinated from smallpox in the past five years, or was otherwise immune, 
presumably from having contracted the disease. The proclamation also forbade the 
operators of every form of transport from bringing people without such a certificate into 
the state, and gave them the authority to enforce the regulations the board had issued. The 
proclamation was to take effect on June 1, 1902, five days after the annual meeting.144 
However, before the quarantine was to go into effect, the board met again with 
representatives from the Indiana State Board of Health on May 30th to consider postponing 
it.145 Dr. W. N. Wishard, the board’s president, “rose to state that he was the bearer of an 
official message from the Governor of Indiana to the effect that all necessary expenses 
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incurred by the Board of Health in the suppression of the smallpox would be promptly 
met.”146 He also wished to assure the Kentucky board that they would put men in the field 
the next day to combat the disease, and that “Special attention would be paid to the counties 
bordering the Ohio river, and the disease would be stamped out effectually in a short 
time.”147 This announcement, coming only three days after the initial proclamation of 
quarantine, shows how effective the hard power measure of quarantine could be, not for 
containing the spread of disease, at which it was often imperfect, but as a threat to 
commerce.148 Indiana’s governor, who had not been swayed by the pleas of his own health 
officials to save lives and prevent the suffering of his people, acceded to their requests 
almost immediately once he learned that Kentucky’s board intended to prevent his citizens 
from traveling across the border. In addition, Dr. Wishard’s promise to focus on the 
counties next to the border was calculated to appease the members of Kentucky’s board, 
and it worked. They suspended the quarantine proclamation for ten days from May 30th 
and allowed that “if upon or before the expiration of the ten days the Indiana State Board 
of Health gives official assurance that the epidemic is under control within the borders of 
the State, the said proclamation will be annulled.”149 As the Indiana State Board of Health 
reported steady gains against the disease, the quarantine was suspended again until July 1, 
1902, and on that date it was officially annulled.150 The board’s threat of quarantine against 
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Indiana board’s aims by securing them the necessary funds and support from their own 
governor. However, the Kentucky State Board of Health continued to struggle with the 
challenge of eliminating smallpox within its own borders. 
Soon after it had sustained its authority against Indiana, the board found its power 
challenged from a different direction. Although Dr. McCormack often complained of 
resistance to his policies from rural people who resisted vaccination, this case demonstrates 
that upper-class Kentuckians were far more likely to have their voices heard when they 
opposed the board’s policies. On September 16, 1902, Luther R. Porter, a former banker, 
filed an injunction against the state health board to prevent himself, his wife, and his 
daughter from being taken to the pest house.151 The daughter, Miss Amelia Porter, was 
alleged to have smallpox, and the injunction, initially granted by the county judge, was 
swiftly dissolved by Judge Barker of Louisville, who held that “boards of health are 
invested with ample authority to order anyone to the pest house when it is deemed 
necessary for the welfare and protection of a neighborhood or a community.”152 Despite 
the judge’s ruling, multiple newspapers took Porter’s side of the case. The Evening Bulletin 
of Maysville Kentucky wrote that “The action of Dr. McCormack, Secretary of the State 
Board of Health, in entering the home of a citizen of Bowling Green by subterfuge, and 
forcibly removing the family, including a sick and weakly child, to a small tent improvised 
as a pest house, deserves the severest condemnation.”153 In addition, they opined that “If 
the father of this child had used a shotgun in defense of his home, no jury of fair-minded 
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Kentuckians would have done anything with him.”154 In addition to this chilling 
endorsement of violence against health officers, the Louisville Commercial wrote that “One 
of the most esteemed physicians in Kentucky said to The Commercial that the removal of 
the Porter child exposed the community to infection more than would its contiued [sic] 
isolation in its father’s comfortable home. And he added that he would have killed Dr. 
McCormack before he would have submitted to such treatment had he been in Mr. Porter’s 
place.”155 Both papers felt that the health officers had acted unreasonably in removing the 
child and her family from their home, and that the board had overstepped its authority by 
enforcing the decision.  
In addition to condemning the board removing the Porters from their home, the 
Louisville Commercial wrote that this most recent outrage was “on par with the threatened 
quarantine of Kentucky against Indiana,” and argued that “The people of Kentucky cannot 
afford to pass over this second exhibition of reckless tyranny that the Health Board has 
given within so short a time.”156 Evidently, the events of the summer had not been lost on 
the people of Kentucky, and they condemned the board’s efforts to close the borders 
between the two states. The paper urged the Legislature to curb the powers of the board to 
protect Kentuckians’ civil rights.157 Although the Evening Bulletin and the Louisville 
Commercial were likely sincere in their condemnation, it is notable that they were coming 
to the defense of a former banker and his family rather than a marginalized member of the 
community. In a later article on the case the Bulletin emphasized that “The victim in the 
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Bowling Green case was not a “vagrom n*****,” but the little daughter of a reputable 
citizen of that place – forcibly seized in her father’s house and rigidly quarantined in a 
leaky ten by ten tent.”158 It is clear that both class and race played a part in these papers’ 
motivation for defending the Porters, and that they might even have supported the board 
had the case involved a poor or Black member of their communities. Nonetheless, 
removing smallpox victims to the pest house remained an unpopular measure. 
By the end of 1903, there had been at least 21,616 cases and 300 deaths from 
smallpox in Kentucky since the disease first appeared in Middlesboro.159 While the board 
had made every effort to stamp it out, it noted that smallpox had “again appeared in several 
widely-separated sections,” and that “It is also prevalent in adjoining States, and 
everywhere manifests a tendency to break over official control and assume an epidemic 
form.”160 As Dr. Hurty of the Indiana State Board of Health had pointed out, in light of 
Kentucky’s own disease burden their proposed quarantine of his state may have been 
somewhat hypocritical. This fact notwithstanding, they continued to push for vaccination 
among their citizens and insisted that the $515,775 so far expended to combat the disease 
“would be more than enough to keep every person in Kentucky thoroughly vaccinated for 
a generation, so that the existence of anything but an imported case of smallpox would be 
an impossibility,” if it had been applied to vaccination from the first rather than containing 
epidemics.161 McCormack and his colleagues on the board were not alone in insisting that 
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it made economic sense to prevent disease. Other Progressives in favor of sanitary reform, 
such as William Henry Welch of Johns Hopkins, believed that investing in a healthy 
population would avoid the cost of early deaths among working people.162 Despite this 
reasoning, vaccination proceeded slowly. Dr. M. F. Reed, Secretary of the Lee County 
Board of Health, estimated that by August 20, 1903, 2,550 people, or forty percent, of the 
people in his county had been vaccinated, leaving the remaining sixty percent 
unprotected.163 He reported that “The chief difficulties in stamping out the disease have 
been in getting the people to submit to vaccination, many claiming to have no faith in the 
efficacy of vaccination or the protection therefrom. This we are inclined to take as an 
excuse merely, for no sane person who cares to look up the history of vaccination could 
for one moment doubt the protection of vaccination.”164 Such statements represented the 
gap between health professionals and their patients’ understanding of current medical 
knowledge, as well as the failure of the board’s attempts at health communication, whether 
through literature or speeches, to reach or convince the public whose cooperation they 
needed. Judith Walzer Leavitt argues that health officials “saw one side of the issue, the 
public’s health, while many people and politicians saw another side, their individual 
rights.”165 Furthermore, these officials often believed that they were obligated to make 
decisions for the “uneducated masses” on public health matters.166 They did not recognize 
that their patients could have legitimate questions or complaints, especially on contentious 
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issues such as vaccination. Whether the board attempted to secure compliance through hard 
or soft power measures, their constituents retained the agency to resist measures in which 
they could not see a benefit in the face of health officials’ unshakable conviction that they 
knew best. 
Despite the continued importation of smallpox into Kentucky, particularly from 
Indiana, five years after the disease arrived, McCormack judged that progress was being 
made, as “in most counties the experience of former years was of value to both the health 
and fiscal officials, and the ease and lessened cost of management were evident.” In another 
victory, where before virtually every county health officer had served without pay, one 
third were now receiving an annual salary. Paying county health officers enabled them to 
respond to reports of smallpox immediately and confine the disease to one person or family 
at little expense. In contrast, unpaid health officers had trouble securing the funds necessary 
to discharge their duties, resented the possibility of not receiving compensation for their 
work, and dreaded the abuse they would receive for carrying out their duties. In 
consequence, they often neglected these duties “until the disease had gained a strong 
foothold, and an expensive and entirely avoidable epidemic had to be faced.” Despite the 
lessons five years of smallpox had provided, the response on both the state and county level 
continued to be limited by the vagaries of fiscal officials, who in many cases still refused 
to provide the necessary funds to quash outbreaks before they spiraled out of control.167 
After six years of fighting smallpox, the situation gradually became more 
manageable. At the board’s annual meeting on Monday, May 16, 1904, Dr. McCormack 
reported that during the past fiscal year “smallpox has given distinctly less trouble than in 
 




any year since 1897.” He attributed this to several causes. First, in cities and towns enough 
people had finally been vaccinated to prevent widespread epidemics. Second, each 
population center now had an isolation hospital where smallpox cases could safely be cared 
for without disturbing business and travel. Finally, the experience of previous years had 
“been valuable to the health and fiscal officials, medical profession and people, and the 
disease was generally brought under control with less time, effort and expense.” It appeared 
that they were finally getting smallpox under control.168 
Dr. McCormack also suggested that “Even in the country districts, under the 
comprehensive, kind but firm policy of the health officials, resistance to vaccination and 
other necessary restrictive measures has appreciably lessened.”169 If true, this would be a 
remarkable achievement given the long opposition to vaccination rural Kentuckians had 
offered in previous years. However, the measures taken to control a smallpox outbreak in 
Hopkinsville, Kentucky, complicate this view. On Monday, November 21, 1904, Dr. 
McCormack visited Hopkinsville and “stirred up the local authorities on the continued 
prevalence of smallpox in many parts of the county.”170 As a result, the Fiscal Court and 
City Council put new measures in place to control the disease: every person with smallpox 
would be taken to the eruptive hospitals four miles north of town, every person had to be 
vaccinated or else fined $100, and a reward of $1 would be provided for information 
concerning a case of smallpox which was concealed from the health officers.171 $100 was 
a punishing fine for the average person, equating to almost $3,000 in the present, which 
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would provide a significant impetus to be vaccinated.172 In addition, the city would keep 
public vehicles available to transport people to racially segregated hospitals, and the health 
officer, Dr. J. B. Jackson, would have his salary raised from $200 a year to $600, with Dr. 
Austin Bell of the State Board of Health there to assist him for fifteen days at $10 per 
day.173 These measures were strict, with the $100 fine particularly harsh for poor families, 
and suggest that the lessening of resistance to health measures was accomplished by the 
strict enforcement of isolation and vaccination policies, rather than the “kind but firm 
policy of the health officials.”174 
In fact, as opposed to the humane policies shown to those fleeing yellow fever, the 
enforcement of smallpox control measures in Hopkinsville better resembled those 
undertaken in Middlesboro in terms of their disproportionate effect on Black people. The 
Hopkinsville Kentuckian reported that the five deaths so far from smallpox had all been 
Black residents of the county.175 The newspaper sounded almost gleeful when it reported 
that “The negroes are thoroughly scared at the talk of compulsory vaccination and are 
hunting up the physicians in droves and having themselves vaccinated.”176 This fear seems 
reasonable, as those with smallpox who had not come voluntarily were “round[ed] up” by 
Dr. Jackson and taken to the hospital, which contained twenty-six Black people and no 
white people by November 26, showing the disproportionate burden of the disease the 
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Black community had to bear.177 There was also a clear divide between the urban 
Hopkinsville and the rural part of the county, as “The excitement is a source of amusement 
to the city people, as everybody nearly has been vaccinated and there are but few cases in 
the city.”178 Bearing out the Dr. McCormack’s assertion that resistance had “appreciably 
lessened,” the Hopkinsville Kentuckian reported that “There is no opposition anywhere to 
the enforcement of the law.”179 However, it is unclear whether explicitly violent measures 
were taken to bring Black smallpox victims to the hospital, and therefore whether this lack 
of opposition was voluntary or enforced through coercive violence. 
On December 1, the Hopkinsville Kentuckian reported that “The health officers 
have been busy all the week gathering up the negroes strolling about with small-pox in the 
country, and believe now that they have about all of them in confinement.”180 With this 
paternalistic statement, the newspaper implied that the Black residents of the county had 
no concern for smallpox, and that it was up to white doctors to save them and the county 
from their carelessness. It followed this statement with one asserting that of the forty Black 
smallpox victims in Gracey hospital, “None are very sick and all are making heavy 
demands for provisions and supplies, embracing everything from fancy groceries to loads 
of corn. The Concord hospital is full of negroes, and they too are being cared for so well 
that nearly every negro with the itch is anxious to get into the “pest house.””181 This 
statement is hard to credit in terms of the parsimony of Kentucky’s fiscal officials in the 









victims. It seems far more likely that if Black smallpox victims were eager to enter the 
isolation hospital, it was out of the fear of arrest. The newspaper itself warned that “If you 
haven’t been vaccinated you are liable to be arrested unless you leave town.”182 The paper 
recorded only one arrest, of a Mr. John L. Griffith, who was assessed the minimum fine of 
$10 for refusing to allow his two-year-old child to be taken to the Cedar Grove hospital for 
smallpox patients. The case was seen as a test case, and the newspaper felt that after this 
there would be no further resistance to the health board’s orders.183 
By December 6, the situation appeared to be under control, although three new 
cases in “prominent families” had been reported.184 At this point, the remaining recorded 
cases totaled seven or eight white people, along with a staggering one hundred and forty-
five among the county’s Black residents.185 Nonetheless, the paper celebrated that “Twenty 
negroes were discharged at Concord Saturday and many other convalescents are waiting 
for favorable weather to be turned out. The dismissals will now exceed the admissions.”186 
In addition to this good news, vaccination in the city was nearly complete, and Dr. Woodard 
had recorded 5,346 vaccinations in the previous two weeks.187 However, the county records 
were not yet available.188 Finally, the newspaper was able to report that “Dr. McCormack 
was here Saturday and complimented the work done.”189 With this statement it can be 
surmised that McCormack, as he had in Middlesboro, approved the measures taken to 
capture and confine the county’s Black smallpox victims who were disproportionately at 
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risk for the disease, and did not see this harsh treatment as contradictory with attributing 
the lessening of resistance against vaccination to kindness and firmness on the part of the 
county health officials. 
In addition to lauding the state’s health officials, McCormack touted the March 2nd 
passage of an amendment to the health law, H.B. 190, which would advance this work.190 
He announced that “With carefully selected medical men and members of the fiscal courts 
equitably represented on the county boards, and a salaried medical man in each county to 
look after its public health affairs, the dissensions which have so interfered with our work 
in many localities in the past should be greatly minimized.”191 While it took a great deal of 
time and effort, as well as experimentation with effective structural design, the board was 
beginning to secure the legislation and public cooperation necessary to carry out its aims 
of preventing and containing disease. In addition to this local law, resistance to vaccination 
may have diminished due to the February 20, 1905 Supreme Court ruling in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, which stated that personal liberties could be suspended when the general 
public’s safety was at risk.192 This affirmed the state board’s ability to impose fines or 
imprison people who refused vaccination, although it would not allow them to use forcible 
vaccination.193 
At the next year’s annual meeting on June 10, 1905, McCormack informed his 
colleagues that only four counties, Christian, Trigg, Todd, and Muhlenberg, had 
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experienced serious epidemics of smallpox during the past year. He noted that in these 
cases, “Failure to recognize the danger at the outset, and lack of a prompt and proper moral 
and financial support from the fiscal officials,” caused the first three epidemics. The one 
in Muhlenberg initially mirrored Middlesboro’s 1898 epidemic, as “the disease had gained 
such a foothold in an ignorant mining population before it was recognized and reported 
that the situation taxed the capacity of a good county Board of Health, supported by an 
excellent fiscal court.” McCormack’s label of the mining community as “ignorant” shows 
his continuing condescension towards those segments of Kentucky’s population which 
lacked the experience or knowledge to take preventive steps against disease, who were 
often the same people that attempts at public health communication did not reach due to 
their poverty or illiteracy.194 
In contrast to the four serious outbreaks in 1905, in most incidents of smallpox that 
year the health officials were able to control the disease by limiting it to the first case or 
family. McCormack attributed these counties’ success to “a thorough understanding and 
co-operation between the fiscal and health officials.” He noted that the statute passed the 
previous year, providing for a salaried health officer in each town and county as well as 
fiscal officers on the county boards of health, was successfully fostering smoother 
operations between officials who had often been at odds in the past, showing that their 
efforts at designing effective systems were increasingly paying off. With this friction 
removed, McCormack anticipated that “new and wide fields of usefulness are opened up 
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in our lifesaving work.” Having made enemies into allies, they secured the power, if not to 
prevent smallpox outbreaks altogether, at least to limit their scope and severity.195 
By 1907, McCormack was able to report that smallpox “has been practically 
eliminated from the sick and mortality tables.”196 He attributed this to the self-sacrificing 
efforts of the members of local boards of health, of whom 795 were totally unpaid and the 
other fifty received little money.197 He lamented that many of these officials had in past 
years been “met by suspicion and derision from fiscal officials and open denunciation, 
often by threats of personal violence, from people of intelligence on other subjects,” simply 
for requesting the materials necessary to do their jobs.198 Nonetheless, the threat of 
smallpox had receded. McCormack conceded that “Outbreaks are likely to occur from time 
to time in the country districts where ignorance and indifference has restricted the work of 
vaccination, but the population in the cities and towns are at least so generally protected by 
vaccination as to confine the danger to such districts almost entirely.”199 Notwithstanding 
the vulnerability of rural districts, after nearly ten years the board had finally managed to 
control smallpox in Kentucky. 
3.2 Preventing Yellow Fever in 1905 
 
Smallpox had been eradicated in Kentucky mostly through the hard work of vaccination 
and the lessons won from experience. In the case of yellow fever, the board was able to 
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mount a more effective response eight years after its first encounter primarily due to an 
improved scientific understanding of transmission routes. Following the conclusion of the 
Spanish-American War in 1900, United States Army Surgeon Walter Reed and his 
colleagues used human trials to demonstrate that mosquitoes could transmit the disease.200 
In addition to the previous tactics used in 1897, this new understanding allowed the board 
to implement more targeted measures to prevent the disease in Kentucky. In the winter of 
1904-5, Drs. McCormack and Bailey of the Kentucky State Board of Health attended the 
American Public Health Association conference in Havana, Cuba.201 While at this 
conference they became convinced that yellow fever could be transmitted between people 
only when the mosquito species stegomyia fasciata, also known as Aedes aegypti, acted as 
the intermediary host.202 They accepted this new scientific information readily, as did local 
health officials throughout Kentucky. They then took it into account when they made plans 
to combat the disease, which appeared in several places outside Louisiana on August 3, 
1905.203 
 Practically, this new information did not substantially change their approach. 
Towns such as Hickman, Kentucky, which had been hard-hit during the 1878 epidemic 
which prompted the board’s formation, requested advice on whether to quarantine against 
the spread of yellow fever. The board advised against this and planned to maintain its open-
door policy of the previous epidemic by using city and county officials to track refugees 
who entered Kentucky from other states. It also deputized railway conductors and captains 
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of steamboats from the South to collect the name and destination of each person who came 
into Kentucky and did not possess a certificate of freedom from infection. Having 
established that the fever was transmitted by mosquitoes, they did not use the disinfection 
protocols which had been an important part of their approach to the 1897 epidemic. Instead, 
they instructed health authorities across the state to “drain, empty or properly oil or cover 
all ponds, barrels or other receptacles which are or may become breeding places for 
mosquitoes; and it is urged that all houses be screened… against mosquitoes.” These last 
instructions reflected the new understanding that mosquitoes were the primary vector of 
the disease. However, the measures themselves were not new, having been adapted from 
those used to combat malaria, which had been recognized as a mosquito-borne disease for 
decades.204 
 During this epidemic, the board used its authority in an unusual way: to lift 
quarantines rather than imposing them. Dr. McCormack informed towns such as Fulton, 
Kentucky which imposed their own quarantines against the board’s advice that “After 
careful consideration of the yellow fever situation, this board has decided that local 
quarantines are worse than useless, giving rise to a false sense of security which interferes 
with the exercise of effectual precautions and imposing unnecessary restrictions upon 
travel and commerce. For these reasons it is my duty to give you official notice that the 
quarantine imposed by your board is hereby raised.” In Paducah, Kentucky, the local board 
of health complied with the state board’s position but faced opposition from the town’s 
business community.205 Mayor Yeiser had been informed of the state board raising 
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quarantines in Fulton and Hickman, but “it was his opinion and the opinion of a number of 
business men, that the state board of health can not prevent Paducah from taking steps to 
safeguard the health of the city.”206 As in Middlesboro seven years earlier, the local 
government of Paducah retained its belief that its decisions should override those of state 
government bodies as well as their own local board of health. The people of Paducah felt 
that the “open door” policy had exposed them to danger, as well as resulting in “numerous 
towns threatening to quarantine against us, and actually causing one city to close her doors 
to us entirely.”207 Near the end of August, after learning that the city intended to impose a 
quarantine ordinance, Dr. McCormack stated that the state board of health had ordered him 
to raise any quarantine within six hours, and that if the city persisted with the quarantine 
he would order all trains to run through Paducah at the rate of twelve miles an hour, and 
the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis railroad not to run any trains in to Paducah at all.208 
While this hard power measure may have been effective, it would seem to have had a 
similar effect to quarantining the town, and therefore does not entirely make sense as a 
threat. Mayor Yeiser responded that the state board of health “could go to “Hades,” with 
special stress on the “Hades.” He declared he did not believe it just to a community of 
25,000 people, - nor lawful, - for a few men several hundred miles away, and unaware of, 
and indifferent to, the conditions which do and might menace Paducah, to say that we shall 
or shall not do this or that when we deem it essential to our welfare.”209 He determined to 
establish a quarantine by ordinance rather than by the state health board, an opinion which 
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he said was backed by some of the best attorneys in Paducah.210 In this case, the state 
board’s hard power threats were ineffective. 
 On the state level, the epidemic had become so alarming by August 25 that the 
board instituted more serious measures. They directed transportation companies that unless 
a person held a certificate from a state or federal official stating that they had remained in 
a detention camp for at least seven days they could not be sold a ticket into Kentucky.211 
The railroad and steamboat companies almost uniformly complied with this order. The 
Paducah Sun approved of this measure, which it deemed an “inspection quarantine” and 
determined to mean that “the state board of health of Kentucky is beginning to realize that 
it has made a serious blunder, and is weakening.”212 However, rather than the danger from 
yellow fever, the city remained most concerned about the threat of other cities quarantining 
against them and hoped for some way to “escape the heavy loss of trade and business that 
has already resulted indirectly from the action of the state and city boards of health.”213 
Here, as in Indiana, the Paducah government was more concerned about the loss of 
commerce than the threat of a severe disease harming their citizens. 
On October 10, 1905, a “killing frost” removed the danger from mosquitoes, and 
the next day McCormack telegraphed all but one railroad company to thank them for their 
cooperation in combating the epidemic. In the last case, McCormack sent Mr. W. A. 
Garrett, General Manager of the Cincinnati, New Orleans, and Texas Pacific Railway a 
telegram informing him that “all restrictions against admission of passengers from the 
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South are hereby removed, and that we regret that violation of them by your road caused 
the only cases of fever we had in the State.”214 As he had demonstrated in earlier letters to 
men whose actions posed a danger to the Commonwealth, McCormack was not above 
using shame to encourage future compliance. 
3.3 Preventing Routine Illnesses 
 
Yellow fever and smallpox epidemics attracted the most attention from Kentucky’s 
citizens, but most of the deaths in Kentucky came from more routine diseases. Beginning 
early in his career, Dr. McCormack was frustrated by the fact that most of his constituents 
took epidemic diseases such as smallpox and yellow fever more seriously than they did 
more common illnesses. In his treatise “Powers and Duties of Local Boards of Health,” 
published in 1883, he noted that “A few cases of smallpox will cause a great scare: a 
hundred cases of yellow fever will destroy the commerce of a city or state; and a thousand 
or less cases of cholera will paralyze the business of our whole country; but ten times as 
many equally good people may perish from our common everyday diseases without 
causing a ripple.”215 He continued to observe this fact throughout his career, and undertook 
a years-long project to inform the public of the true level of danger they faced from 
epidemic diseases as opposed to endemic diseases, which are present at a relatively 
constant level in the population.216  
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In 1901, McCormack recommended that the State Board of Health organize 
monthly health conventions for the public in every county in the state to educate them on 
the best ways to prevent typhoid fever, diphtheria, scarlet fever, consumption, and other 
preventable diseases.217 He also called for the circulation of monthly leaflets on public 
health topics to be distributed throughout the state and to be published in the newspapers 
to inform readers about these diseases.218 McCormack noted that the circulars were revised 
when new scientific information became available, and that “an attempt has been made to 
couch all of them in plain terms, adapted to popular use.”219 While several of these 
pamphlets had diagrams, and the one on smallpox included graphic photographs of 
different stages of the disease, the language and the tone used in them may have been 
alienating for their intended audience. For instance, the pamphlet on “Prevention of 
Consumption” used the words “sputum” and “expectoration,” words which might not have 
been familiar to lay audiences. In addition, the circular on smallpox stated that “Ignorant 
and obstinate officials and communities usually get their first bias and inspiration from 
some equally ignorant or obstinate doctor.” Such judgmental language was likely to make 
the public feel condescended to, and perhaps therefore less inclined to follow the otherwise 
sound advice contained in the pamphlet.220 A similar circular from Tennessee entitled 
“Diphtheria – Its Restriction and Prevention,” issued in 1884, used inaccessible language 
such as “predispose” and “malignancy,” although it did not make a claim to accessibility 
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as Kentucky’s had, nor did it denigrate a community’s doctors.221 In either case, it appears 
that the members of both state boards of health, as educated elites, were unfamiliar with 
the kind of language which would be appropriate to reach all members of their society. 
In addition to the potentially alienating language, as McCormack himself observed, 
the information contained in the pamphlets would primarily have reached “every family in 
the State which reads the newspapers.”222 Not every family read the newspapers, and 
furthermore, not every family could read. According to the United States census, in 1900 
16.5 percent of Kentucky’s citizens ten years or older were illiterate, with that number 
decreasing to 12.1 percent by 1910.223 In 1910 27.6 percent of Black Kentuckians were 
illiterate as compared to 10 percent of native-born whites, and 14 percent of rural 
Kentuckians but only 6.7 percent of urbanites.224 The education deficits created by racism 
and rurality meant that meant that printed attempts at public health communication would 
not reach the entirety of the state’s population. As Middlesboro’s smallpox epidemic and 
Hopkinsville’s outbreak had demonstrated, Black Kentuckians were particularly 
vulnerable to infectious disease and it was crucial for them to have accurate information to 
protect themselves. However, there is no indication that McCormack thought in these terms 
or designed his campaigns to reach these vulnerable segments of the population. 
One obstacle to defeating the more mundane diseases was the board’s dearth of 
accurate information on their impact. In the absence of a formal reporting structure for 
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cases of disease, and with a vital statistics department yet to be established, Dr. 
McCormack attempted to remedy this situation in 1905 by enlisting the help of every 
doctor in Kentucky. This approach of surveying doctors directly to obtain the statistics 
needed appears to have been a unique strategy to get around the lack of an operational vital 
statistics law, which Kentucky did not pass until 1911.225 Nearby states passed effective 
statewide vital statistics laws around that time, Indiana in 1907, Tennessee in 1908, 
Virginia in 1912, Illinois in 1915, and West Virginia in 1917, but none seem to have 
attempted to contact doctors directly to supplement their records in prior years, generally 
relying on county records or imperfectly implemented previous state laws instead.226 
To obtain at least partial disease records, McCormack sent each doctor a letter with 
a form attached, asking them to fill out the number of cases of consumption, typhoid fever, 
diphtheria, scarlet fever, cholera infantum, and dysentery that they had treated in the period 
between August 31, 1903 and August 31, 1905.227 He was also eager to know how much 
treating these diseases had cost the patients, and what percent of them had not paid for the 
services they received.228 In addition to the suffering and death they caused, during his 
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tenure McCormack frequently brought attention to the monetary cost of disease in the 
hopes of convincing his fellow citizens to help him combat it, recognizing that for some, 
cost-saving measures could be more attractive than saving lives.229 It is notable that even 
at this early stage of public health, McCormack assured the doctors that “This information 
is given with the understanding that it is strictly confidential, and that this blank will be 
destroyed as soon as the figures are taken from it.”230 As a doctor and a public health 
official he recognized the need to keep patient records confidential even in this aggregate 
form, to protect both the doctors who supplied the statistics and their patients. 
Despite the urgency of the request, only one-third of the physicians he contacted 
gave him the information from their books. Extrapolating from these records, McCormack 
and his colleagues calculated that during the two-year period specified, there were 45,024 
cases of typhoid fever in the state and 3,366 deaths. For consumption the figures were 
23,958 cases and 12,876 deaths; for cholera infantum 32,634 cases and 3,870 deaths; for 
diphtheria 10,362 cases and 2,136 deaths; for dysentery 44,766 cases and 1,866 deaths; and 
for scarlet fever 2,721 cases and 119 deaths. In total, this meant that of a population of 
2,711,450 people, 173,070, or one in fifteen had caught one of these diseases, and 24,828, 
or one in 109 people had died from it. Each of these diseases was known to be preventable 
at the time, and McCormack reported each death toll with the aggrieved tone of one who 
does not understand why his advice remains unheeded. He wrote that “any one of these 
diseases causes more deaths in Kentucky every year than smallpox, yellow fever and 
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cholera have done in all the history of the state.” However, as the less-feared diseases such 
as typhoid and diphtheria were not considered to be an immediate epidemic threat, the 
board had less scope to prevent them through the hard-power measures that it had used 
against yellow fever and smallpox. Therefore, they had to use less direct soft power 
measures such as educational literature to inform the public. As noted earlier, this method 
may have been effective in some cases, but the terminology the board considered “plain” 
may not have appeared so to their readers. In addition to this alienating language, with a 
large population of nonliterate persons in Kentucky and particularly its Black citizens, the 
reach of their message was woefully incomplete if they aimed to convince their citizenry 
to take common diseases as seriously as those which appeared in epidemic form.231 
3.4 Education for a New Era 
 
 
Fortunately, circulating literature on disease prevention was not the only soft power 
measure available to the board. By 1907, after seeing the limited success they achieved in 
educating the public through literature alone, Secretary McCormack was convinced that 
they must communicate more directly with the people. He argued that “Legislation, 
however complete, and appropriations, however large, have a very limited value unless 
supported by an educated public sentiment.”232 Laws, resources, and especially the hard 
power measures necessary in epidemics could not fully succeed unless the public 
understood their purpose and approved of them. Therefore, it was crucial to find ways to 
convince the public that these measures were designed to protect them rather than to limit 
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their freedoms. In another instance, during Milwaukee’s 1925 fight against smallpox, 
health officials blanketed the city with education literature, using newspapers, posters, 
bulletins in factories, and letters to every major employer in the city.233 In addition, they 
used radio spots and warnings on movie screens, incorporating an element of fear into their 
campaign against smallpox.234 The latter two methods of transmitting the message were 
not yet available to McCormack and the board in 1907, but Milwaukee’s experience 
suggests that limiting their messaging to newspapers was insufficient to convince the 
public that they should acquiesce to measures designed to protect the public health. 
In addition to his work as secretary of the Kentucky State Board of Health, 
McCormack spent the years from 1902 to 1911 as an organizer for the American Medical 
Association, attempting to set up a system in which each county and state had a medical 
society, and each of these fed into the Association to create an equally represented and 
unified medical profession throughout the country.235 He and his colleagues intended these 
efforts at organization to extend the reach and power of the medical profession, particularly 
in their ability to pass legislation to protect the public health and to convince the public of 
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its necessity.236 Therefore, he was speaking not only as a member of the medical profession 
but as an instrumental player in this effort when he wrote that “though a system of societies 
extending into every country,” they had “begun a campaign of education with the view of 
enlisting the lay leaders of public opinion of every community in the entire country in this 
altruistic, health and life saving reform, one of the most important that has ever engaged 
the attention of a people.”237 As with their attempts at reaching the public through literature, 
McCormack and his colleagues aimed to educate the most privileged and respected in the 
community first, believing that they would then convince others of the necessity of public 
health measures. The idea of this campaign was to hold meetings at the county societies or 
schools with “local organizations of teachers, lawyers, ministers, druggists, editors, 
farmers, women’s clubs and other bodies which lead and mould [sic] public opinion.”238 
They hoped to enlist teachers to take what they had learned in these meetings and deliver 
the message to children using a “stereopticon and other demonstrations,” in order to 
educate them on the vital topic of public health.239 Here, as with the pamphlets, the board 
recognized that visual demonstrations were likely to be at least as effective at convincing 
the public as words. Although McCormack had referred to the campaign as an altruistic 
one, as it was for the public good, he also revealed a more calculated motive for it, arguing 
that “In this way it will be easy to provide voters, legislators, and administrators in the next 
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generation about whose sympathy and co-operation there will be no question.”240 By 
targeting the information at children, the board could be sure of inculcating their agenda 

























CHAPTER 4. VITAL LEGISLATION AND THE PRICE OF A $30,000 
APPROPRIATION 
Since its establishment, lack of funding was one of the major obstacles to the success of 
the State Board of Health’s policies. In 1899, for instance, a year when the Massachusetts 
board was given $113,300 and the median funding for all states was $11,250, Kentucky 
received only $2,500, the lowest amount allocated for public health work in any state.241 
This inadequate appropriation lasted from the board’s founding in 1878 to 1900, when the 
General Assembly raised it to $5,000.242 This action was necessary due to the great expense 
of combating smallpox epidemics across the state in the previous two years, which early in 
1899 had caused the board not only to exhaust the fund it had been gradually accumulating 
but had placed it in debt.243 From that point onward they were forced to send inspectors to 
counties in need of aid only when their fiscal authorities agreed to pay their expenses ahead 
of time.244  
Doubling the board’s appropriation to $5,000 allowed them to carry out the vital 
functions with which they were tasked, though McCormack continued to deem the sum 
insufficient. In the 1906-1907 edition of the Biennial Report of the State Board of Health 
of Kentucky, McCormack published two lists of figures. The first was titled “Contrast in 
Appropriations in Kentucky for Other Purposes and for the Public Health Work,” and listed 
the amounts allocated for various governmental purposes, with “Public Schools” at the top, 
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receiving $2,234,509 in 1905, and “Public Health Works” at the bottom, receiving just 
$5,000.245 The second list was an updated version of the amount allocated for public health 
in various states, in which Pennsylvania, at $1,000,000, had eclipsed Massachusetts, which 
now boasted an appropriation of $138,500.246 The median funding hovered between 
Kansas and Vermont at $19,760.247 McCormack had placed Kentucky, with $5,000, at the 
bottom of the list, although there may have been other states not included that ranked lower. 
Aside from titling each list “Contrast in Appropriations,” McCormack made no further 
comment, but the message was clear. He was growing increasingly impatient with the state 
legislature’s neglect of public health and sought to shame them into giving the board a 
larger appropriation by comparing its allocation with other governmental functions and the 
ample amounts provided by other states. The Kentucky General Assembly finally 
ameliorated this situation to some extent by raising the board’s appropriation to $30,000 
per year, beginning on January 1, 1911.248  
4.1 Expanding the State Board of Health 
 
Reflecting on the new appropriation, Dr. McCormack noted that it seemed “small 
compared with $3,644,000 in Pennsylvania and the large sums available annually in New 
York, Massachusetts, Ohio, Indiana and other states, but… we did as much in the past with 
an annual appropriation of $5,000 as many states did with five and ten times that 
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amount.”249 Despite McCormack’s frustration that the new appropriation still did not come 
close to that of other states, it allowed the board to significantly expand its programs to aid 
the people of Kentucky. The new law created a department of vital statistics, “that the 
causes of sickness and mortality may be known and utilized,” a department of sanitary 
engineering, “To make a survey and investigation of the rivers, creeks, water sheds, 
springs, wells, and other matters relating to the sources and purity of the water supply in 
all sections of the State,” and a department of bacteriology, whose director could compel a 
salary of up to twenty-five hundred dollars, if the board so chose.250 McCormack 
commented that “their creation had been so long sought and marks such an era in the health 
and life-saving work in which we are engaged, and must prove such an event in the civil 
history of Kentucky, as to merit special comment and congratulation.”251 In fact, the 
demand for these new services was so strong that the board appointed directors for each of 
them at a meeting of the board on August 11, 1910, and they served at reduced salaries 
provided by a small fund that the board had saved until the new appropriation arrived at 
the beginning of 1911.252  
The department of vital statistics vastly expanded the power of the board by 
providing it with accurate information about every birth and death which occurred in the 
state, as well as the location and cause of each death.253 Dr. W. L. Heizer was selected to 
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fill the position at eighteen hundred dollars per year with reasonable expenses.254 
McCormack noted that although Kentucky had long kept meticulous records of financial 
transactions, livestock and crops, “in all the history of the State until January 1, 1911, when 
the new law became operative, human beings had always come into and gone out of the 
world without any official record or notice being made of the facts.”255 This stood in 
contrast to the state of affairs in Massachusetts, where the collection of vital statistics had 
shaped reformers’ understanding of disease and long preceded the establishment of their 
State Board of Health and given them a better understanding of their population’s health.256 
The 1878 law which created the board had directed them to “study the vital statistics of 
this State, and endeavor to make intelligent and profitable use of the collected records of 
deaths and sickness among the people.”257 The fact that it had taken until 1908 to pass such 
a law in Kentucky and until 1911 to put it into practice reflects the inadequate funding and 
lack of legislative will which had forced the board to continually react to emergency 
conditions rather than gathering the information necessary to strategize long-term to 
prevent disease.258 
Kentucky’s General Assembly had made one previous attempt to institute a vital 
statistics law in 1874, preceding the creation of the State Board of Health, but that version 
was deemed expensive and impractical.259 The current law had been prepared by the 
American Civic Federation two years earlier, in an effort to pass similar laws across the 
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country. The assistance of undertakers and physicians throughout the state secured its 
smooth operation.260 It was a vitally necessary improvement on the voluntary statistics 
provided by physicians in previous years, which had necessitated mere estimates of the 
prevalence of disease and mortality in Kentucky in contrast to the accurate figures the board 
would now receive.261 Only a year after the law began to operate, it had already alerted the 
board to outbreaks of typhoid fever and poliomyelitis, allowing them to cooperate with 
local boards.262 It had also shown that hookworm, a disease caused by small, round, 
parasitic worms, and pellagra, which was referred to as “a new and important disease,” 
cause yet unknown, existed throughout the state, enabling the board to research these 
diseases in order to prevent them.263 The implementation of the vital statistics law vastly 
improved the board’s effectiveness by giving them an accurate understanding of the 
prevailing disease conditions in the state, replacing educated guesses with certainty. 
The second department funded with the $30,000 allocation was sanitary 
engineering. Historian of sanitation Martin Melosi argues that during this era “The simple 
objective of preventing illness by removing waste or providing water that appeared pure 
was replaced by greater attention to biological pollutants,” but during the first year after 
the department was established Kentucky occupied an intermediate stage between these 
two, attempting to remove waste while also identifying pollutants.264 The first State 
Sanitary Engineer Paul Hansen was appointed September 1, 1910 after the legislature 
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passed an act giving the State Board additional powers to investigate and prevent disease, 
under which they were directed to survey the water sources of the state to protect and purify 
them.265 His salary was fixed at twenty-five hundred dollars per year plus reasonable 
traveling expenses in the discharge of his duties.266 He spent most of his first year in the 
field investigating the water conditions of various cities and counties. As most areas in 
Kentucky had habitually discharged their sewage, both human and animal, into local 
waterways, “the analysis of both public and private waters from every section showed more 
or less palpable contamination often to an extent which needed only the introduction of 
specific infections, as of typhoid fever, such as occurred at Georgetown, Russellville, 
Paintsville, and Sandy Hook, within a period of six months, to give rise to local 
evidences.”267 Aiming to avoid replicating the ill-advised water protection schemes 
adopted by many communities, the board followed Hansen’s recommendation and ordered 
that all such projects had to be submitted for approval by the board.268 In addition, they 
directed the Sanitary Engineer to map the watersheds and supply sources of the entire state 
in order to determine the types and sources of pollution, as well as the illnesses these 
pollutants caused among the state’s population.269 This was an effort that could potentially 
take years, which may have contributed to Mr. Hansen’s decision to resign his position on 
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November 1, 1911, a little over a year after he was appointed, to accept the role of Engineer 
of the Illinois State Water Survey.270  
Upon his departure Mr. E. H. Mark was appointed as director of the department, 
and the board decided to hire an analyst in place of a sanitary engineer to save on salary, 
with a consulting engineer called in to review plans for water works and sewage 
purification plants when necessary, thus allowing the department to hire more laboratory 
and field assistants to accomplish the work more efficiently.271 This adjustment bears out 
Melosi’s contention that in the age of bacteriology, “laboratories took up the task of 
ferreting out biological pollutants; sanitary engineers focused on the operation of the 
technologies of sanitation.”272 Following Hansen’s departure, the department quickly 
shifted from a focus on sanitary engineering to examining pollutants in the water with a 
team of analysts, laboratory and field assistants tasked with keeping the state’s water clean. 
As with the establishment of the department of vital statistics, creating a department of 
sanitary engineering significantly advanced the mission of the board. With typhoid fever 
and similar waterborne diseases a known threat to health, it allowed the board to more 
effectively prevent disease and safeguard the public health, primarily by providing them 
with more accurate information upon which to allocate resources. McCormack, as ever, 
was attentive to the cost effectiveness of prevention, writing that “Pure water… is essential 
to healthy living, and it is only a question whether Kentucky is to be forehanded and protect 
this vast interest where it can be done as comparatively small expense, or repeat here the 
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history of the older civilizations,” who “were forced to impoverish themselves in purifying 
and protecting what should never have been made foul.”273 
In addition to the departments of vital statistics and sanitary engineering, the state 
established the department of bacteriology, under the direction of the new State 
Bacteriologist Dr. Lillian H. South, who was allotted twelve hundred dollars per year plus 
reasonable expenses resulting from the discharge of her duties.274 While it is unclear 
whether McCormack’s shaming in terms of the board’s funding directly resulted in the new 
appropriation, the Kentucky General Assembly’s comments on the reasons for needing a 
State Bacteriologist indicate his influence. They noted that “It is believed by those best 
informed on the subject that fully one-third of the sickness and one-third of the deaths 
which occur in Kentucky every year are caused by [routine illnesses],” and that “It is 
claimed that this unnecessary sickness and mortality imposes an annual tax upon the people 
equal to that legally collected for all purposes.”275 Both statements bear an unmistakable 
similarity to McCormack’s arguments for the necessity of preventing routine illnesses, as 
well as his characteristic linkage between the human and monetary costs of disease. These 
statements provide indirect evidence Dr. McCormack’s efforts at lobbying the legislature 
successfully secured the passage of the law establishing the position of State Bacteriologist. 
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The department of bacteriology was created to help physicians and health boards 
to recognize communicable diseases early by sending samples of suspected cases for 
testing to the laboratory in Bowling Green.276 The board offered this service free of charge, 
with the expectation that “its usefulness will be rapidly extended as local boards of health, 
physicians and the people come to know that it was created to assist them in times of doubt 
and difficulty.”277 They further encouraged use of the service by establishing depots 
supplied with antitoxin, containers, and mailing containers for each kind of specimen to be 
examined in every county of Kentucky, making it easy for doctors and boards of health to 
send specimens to the laboratory.278 In addition to helping counties accurately identify 
cases of disease, the laboratory supplied county and city boards of health with inexpensive 
diphtheritic antitoxin, as well as providing free treatment for those bitten by rabid 
animals.279 Lowering the barrier to entry by offering services free or at a low cost 
undoubtedly induced more people to use them, and greatly facilitated the board’s ability to 
detect outbreaks of disease early in their course.  
In its first twelve months of operation, the laboratory offered facilities for 
“examination of sputum for tubercle bacilli, throat cultures for diphtheria bacilli, blood 
specimens for malaria parasites, the Widal and Diazo reaction for typhoid fever, 
gonococcus, spirachoeta pallida, feces for hookworm, roundworm, tape worm and other 
intestinal parasites, microscopic urinalysis and rabies.”280 In that first year, the department 
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of bacteriology aided the department of vital statistics in recognizing that hookworm was 
endemic to counties throughout the state, showing that statistics gathered from physicians’ 
reports and laboratory science could work in concert of provide the State Board of Health 
with up to date information on its people’s vulnerability to illness.281 Dr. South reported 
that the laboratory examined 3,249 specimens in its first twelve months, increasing its 
number of examinations from fifty-seven in January to 932 in December.282 This rise 
suggests that over that period increasing numbers of physicians utilized the service to 
confirm whether their diagnoses were correct, but may also indicate that the lab became 
more efficient over the course of the year. In either case, from its inception the laboratory 
provided an invaluable service by enabling doctors to accurately identify cases of disease 
where before they would have been forced to rely only on the symptoms they had observed. 
In addition, Dr. South’s identification of positive cases tested by the laboratory furnished 
the State Board of Health with a more accurate understanding of the presence of 
tuberculosis, typhoid fever, malaria, diphtheria, gonorrhea, ophthalmia neonatorum, 
syphilis, and hookworm than they could have gathered from the department of vital 
statistics alone.283 
The increase in the appropriation by the State Legislature to $30,000 per year near 
the end of McCormack’s tenure allowed the State Board of Health to vastly expand its 
utility to the public by providing it with more accurate information about the presence of 
disease in Kentucky. In 1881, near the beginning of his tenure on the board and before he 
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was even elected as Secretary, McCormack had written that “the more thoughtful and 
prudent of the common people begin to appreciate that individual as well as national health 
and wealth depends upon rational attention to the primary conditions upon which health is 
preserved; begin to appreciate that old adage, “an ounce of prevention is better than a pound 
of cure,” is as applicable to health as to any other department of life.”284 With the expansion 
of their funding and the ability to collect accurate information about the presence of disease 
in Kentucky, the State Board of Health had finally secured the knowledge and resources to 
approach the ultimate goal of public health: to prevent disease rather than to cure it.285 
4.2 Questioning the Machinery of Public Health 
 
Throughout its existence, the Kentucky State Board of Health had been beset with funding 
challenges. The $30,000 appropriation which began in 1911 had finally allowed it to 
approach the goal of preventing disease rather than curing it. In 1912, however, at the 
height of its success, the board found itself beset by new political challenges, with finances 
once again at the center. In the past they had primarily faced direct opposition from citizens, 
both upper and lower class, who were opposed to quarantines, pesthouse isolation, and 
vaccination. In this case, however, their autonomy was challenged by a member of the 
Kentucky Legislature. Mr. L. B. Herrington, a Democratic Representative from Madison 
county, started his investigation by claiming that he merely wanted to know how the board 
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had spent the $30,000 it was given by the previous Legislature.286 From its beginning on 
January 16, 1912, however, it was clear that this investigation was primarily aimed at 
probing the affairs of Dr. McCormack. 287 On January 11, Mr. Herrington had put forward 
House Bill 74, “An act to amend Section 1757 of Kentucky Statutes relating to the 
members, qualifications and duties of the State Board of Health,” which aimed to change 
the present system of appointing members by allowing the Governor to select them 
directly.288 Mr. Herrington would carry out the investigation under the purview of the 
House Committee on Kentucky Statutes, and the members of the board would ostensibly 
be there to air their views on the bill he had proposed.289 Representative Herrington stated 
that “Under the present law the different medical societies dictate the appointments, or, are 
supposed to, as the law vests them with the power. These societies have become powerful 
political machines. Especially is this true with the State Medical Society, and Dr. 
McCormack seems to be the absolute dictator thereof.”290 Rather than merely investigating 
how the State Board of Health had spent the money allotted to it, Herrington set out to 
prove the existence of a political machine infesting the health apparatus of the state, with 
McCormack in charge of it all. 
 Herrington’s opprobrium toward the board was by no means universal. Two weeks 
earlier, on the opening day of the Kentucky House’s 1912 legislative session, Hon. Ben L. 
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Bruner, the Secretary of State, had commended the board for its work.291 He noted that 
over the previous “thirty years wonderful progress in the study and prevention of 
[diseases]… have only been possible because of the devotion and work of the thirty-six 
hundred practicing physicians who have performed their function as guardians of the public 
health, furnishing offices and equipment for life saving work, with but small 
compensation.”292 He acclaimed the creation of the departments of Vital Statistics, Sanitary 
Engineering, and Bacteriology under the auspices of the new appropriation, noting that the 
latter department’s laboratories brought “the benefactions of modern scientific methods for 
the prevention of sickness within reach of every hearthstone in Kentucky, free of cost.”293 
He closed his statement with his belief that “the members of the State Board of Health 
merit commendation for services now being performed, and for services rendered during a 
third of a century with ability, energy and efficiency.”294 Nonetheless, Representative 
Herrington felt that their activities required investigation. This division of opinion between 
those who believed that the board was doing excellent work on a limited budget, ably led 
by Dr. McCormack, and those who felt that the board, and especially its Secretary, had too 
much power and had misused the people’s money for their own gain, would carry 
throughout the probe into the board’s affairs. 
 Herrington’s charge of a political machine in the state’s health apparatus was 
unusual for two main reasons. First, as political columnist and author William Safire notes, 
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machine politics in the United States are most often identified with big cities.295 The leader, 
or leaders, tell their constituents who to vote for, and thus remain in positions of power 
through their control of the people.296 In contrast, Dr. McCormack’s alleged organization 
was not city-based, but operated through the medical societies of the state, and therefore 
had no direct political participation. Second, it is unclear what individual physicians across 
the state would have gotten from such an arrangement. Was the passage of legislation in 
favor of the medical profession’s goals enough of an inducement to fall in line? This seems 
unlikely to have been enough to motivate officials on local boards of health or the 
physicians who composed the medical societies. Dr. McCormack and his supporters argued 
repeatedly that Kentucky’s physicians could not be dominated by any man, and that 
McCormack had not sought to do so at any time over the past thirty years.297 
 Whatever the nature of McCormack’s alleged machine, Representative Herrington 
appears to have viewed himself as a reformer. While political machines are often thought 
to have operated mainly in the North, they also operated in southern cities such as 
Nashville, Tennessee, and Lexington, Kentucky.298 Historian James Duane Bolin argues 
that in the early twentieth century, political bossism was intertwined with reform in 
Kentucky’s three largest cities, Lexington, Covington, and Louisville.299 Herrington 
himself acknowledged the moral ambiguity of such machines when he claimed that he was 
“trying to ascertain whether or not Dr. J. N. McCormack, Secretary of the State Board of 
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Health, has a machine or is a one-man power, and if so, whether or not it is a good or bad 
machine. The object of the bill is to break up the bad machine, if one exists, and to place 
the appointing power of all members of the State Board of Health including the Secretary, 
in the hands of the Governor.”300 The Richmond Climax asserted that “Mr. Herrington’s 
Bill is in perfect harmony with the administration’s reform spirit that is seeking to restore 
to responsible government many executive functions that have been delegated to others, in 
plain violation of the Constitution.”301 This assertion is further corroborated by the fact that 
other institutions such as the state university and the Louisville school system were 
investigated in the same period.302 While the investigation was humiliating to McCormack 
and his allies, who alleged that he was being victimized by opponents of food and drug 
reform, Herrington aimed at political reform in the state’s institutions, and there is no 
evidence beyond their allegations that he had any connection to food and drug interests.303 
 The investigation took place over a period of seven weeks, beginning on January 
16, 1912, and ending on March 5.304 Representative Herrington opened the first hearing by 
referring to McCormack as the “smoothest, most plausible, most persuasive and at the same 
time most powerful lobbyist ever known.” Here he surely exaggerated, as the lobbying 
activities he was accusing McCormack of were confined to one state, and health matters at 
that. However, he was not alone in believing that McCormack had a significant influence 
in the state. In commemorating McCormack’s death, the political reporter Will S. 
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Kaltenbacher reflected that “No other man in Kentucky for the last thirty years was so well 
equipped in every way for a political boss and had he turned his talents in that direction he 
would have exercised undisputed political leadership in his state.”305 He went on to write 
that as a political lobbyist, McCormack “remained in the background, but when the time 
came to vote on the bill the solons were deluged with letters and telegrams from their 
constituents sent at the instigation of Dr. McCormack operating through his splendid 
organization that embraced practically every doctor in the State.”306 It is notable that 
Kaltenbacher did not appear to believe that McCormack was a political boss, merely that 
he was well suited to the role. Nonetheless, McCormack’s ability to lobby legislators 
through the efforts of the state’s doctors indicates that he had an enormous amount of 
influence among them. Yet these aspects of McCormack’s organization are missing from 
Herrington’s analysis. As Herrington described it, the “machine” consisted of McCormack 
naming three members of the health board in each county and controlling the State Board, 
along with appointing family and friends to the best positions on the board. The operation 
was completed by the county boards of health appointing McCormack’s friends to 
positions on his behalf.307 
In response to these accusations, McCormack gave a spirited defense. He presented 
the financial records for the State Board of Health since he became its secretary on October 
1, 1883, which had been audited and widely distributed. He then noted that when the new 
appropriation became effective on January 1, 1911, the board had decided that their 
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methods of keeping financial records could be improved. Therefore, McCormack brought 
the committee “a full detailed, numbered statement of each expenditure under the 
appropriation of $30,000, with a voucher-check receipt and itemized account 
corresponding to each entry and indicating the department for which the expense was 
incurred, duplicates of these voucher-checks having been filed with the Auditor of Public 
Accounts, as required by law.” Despite this scrupulousness, it remained to be seen whether 
Herrington and the Committee on Kentucky Statutes would accept his defense.308 
In his full statement, McCormack defended not only his board’s accounting, but his 
own record as a public health practitioner in the state. He noted that in the first twenty-two 
years of the board’s existence it was allotted only $2,500, and which was then raised to 
$5,000 until the most recent $30,000 appropriation the previous year. He claimed it was 
the equal of boards with ten times the funds, but only because of the sacrifices the members 
of his board and county health officers had made, serving without compensation. In 
addition, he had given the board an office in his home, with “heat, light and janitor free of 
cost,” and that “for years my wife and son, and in times of emergency, every servant in the 
household assisted with the clerical and stenographic work, and in getting out the enormous 
mail, without any or at only a nominal cost.” In other words, they had made do with what 
little money they had, and the enormous achievements of the board could be credited to 
manpower rather than graft.309 
In addition to the pure work it took to keep the board running, McCormack sought 
to remind the members of the committee of the more serious sacrifices he had made in 






every section during smallpox and other epidemics, our overalls were covered with scabs 
and pus while we helped to carry the sick to the improvised hospitals and to bury the dead, 
a service which most of you would not render for all the revenues of Kentucky.” He plead 
for their consideration, noting that his least favorite duty had been “haunt[ing] these 
legislative halls year after year, often classed as a lobbyist by those who did not know any 
better, but most nobly supported by my profession of every school of practice as I am now 
begging that authority be given my board and profession to protect the people from 
pestilence and impure food, drugs and quackery.” Although he did not say this outright, 
McCormack must have felt that these hearings were a waste of time in which he could have 
been doing work to serve the people of Kentucky.310 
McCormack’s final statement on his own behalf was an impassioned appeal to his 
own dignity. He stated that “nearly thirty years ago, by a unanimous vote, I was made the 
executive officer of this board, and this has been done at regular intervals since until two 
weeks ago, upon motion of the homeopathic member, seconded by his osteopathic 
colleague. I was again elected unanimously for a term of four years.” He made his argument 
for his continued fitness as secretary based on the merit implied by the esteem of his 
colleagues, even ones who, as homeopaths or osteopaths were considered slightly outside 
the orthodox profession. However, his outrage over the questioning was clear. He 
maintained that “This is the first, and with the fair and impartial hearing I know you will 
give, I expect to make it the last time any man has ever questioned my motives, my capacity 
or my integrity.” He remarked that he had refused to litigate the issue in the press, despite 





are strangers to me, and, since the day this question assumed a personal phase, I have 
spoken to no one or you on the subject, greatly interested as I am in other bills before you, 
and have asked no assistance from any county Board of Health or physician, or written or 
inspired a letter to one of them.” In other words, he attempted to put public health priorities 
over the whims of the committee in questioning his motives. Finally, he told them, “I do 
not need the pittance of a salary, ask no man’s favor and would despise myself if I accepted 
any man’s sympathy. I only court the full, fair investigation which I know you will give 
me and the board, the standing of which has become almost as dear to me as my own, and 
then - justice.” He made himself and his virtuous actions his primary defense against the 
attacks that were being leveled against him.311 
Both Dr. McCormack and his colleague, Dr. D. M. Griffith of Owensboro, denied 
that there was a political machine operating around the State Board of Health. The State 
Medical Association made recommendations to the Governor on who should be appointed 
to the State Board of Health.312 Dr. McCormack said that neither he nor his son, Dr. Arthur 
McCormack, had ever influenced the State Medical Association in making these 
recommendations. In addition, he denied the charge that he had arranged doctors to do 
political work. However, this denial is belied by Kaltenbacher’s observation that 
McCormack directed doctors throughout the state to send letters to their legislators on bills 
of interest to the board.313 In addition, McCormack repudiated the Herrington bills aimed 
at changing how members of the board were appointed, adding that the 3,000 physicians 
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Griffith added his support, saying that politics had always been barred from the State 
Medical Association. He spoke as a former member of the Executive Council who had 
served for seven years, and its one-time president. He claimed that the Association was 
never dominated by anybody. He also seconded McCormack in believing that it would be 
a mistake to allow politicians to appoint members of the State Board of Health. 
The trial continued in this vein for two weeks. On February 7th, it escalated.314 
McCormack was ordered to appear before the committee and deliver records showing the 
income the board had received under the registration act from 1888 to 1912, as well as the 
accompanying vouchers showing how the revenue was disbursed.315 Upon learning of this 
order, McCormack explained that he had not originally known these papers were required, 
which was why he had not brought them before. According to him, “The newspapers, my 
only source of information, led my associates and myself to believe that the investigation 
related solely to the expenditure of the appropriation made of the use of the board by the 
State.”316 Nonetheless, having this rule issued against him by the committee made it clear 
that Representative Herrington intended to continue investigating McCormack’s use of 
funds through the State Board of Health.317 
 Although Herrington was investigating whether Dr. McCormack was at the head of 
political machine, these charges were difficult to prove and based mostly on hearsay. The 
board’s use of money was at the heart of this investigation, and here some of McCormack’s 
statements made his actions seem suspect. According to the Board’s Biennial Report, 
which documents the years from 1897 to 1911, Dr. McCormack’s salary was $1,200 per 
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year, plus the “Traveling expenses of members and secretary,” which ranged from $336.20 
in 1905 to $950.15 in 1910 and averaged $574.42.318 While it is not certain, it is likely that 
the majority of the traveling was done by Dr. McCormack as the board’s secretary, and 
therefore most of the expenses incurred on his behalf in the course of his duties. This $1,200 
salary would be equivalent to approximately $35,000 today, and the average of the travel 
expenses worth an additional $17,000.319 This was on the high end of the average salaries 
for all occupations in 1900, when $1,200 was the average salary for lawyers and architects, 
and surgeons, Dr. McCormack’s former profession, made $1,625 on average.320 Despite 
the fact that he earned more than the majority of his contemporaries, McCormack seems to 
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have felt his compensation inadequate, perhaps because his work as a doctor and surgeon 
had been more lucrative.  
During the time that the State Board of Health was reviewing the validity of 
diplomas for doctors, McCormack explained that in 1896, after all the expenses of lawyers, 
detectives, printing, postage, and expenses had been paid, “of the total amount of $4,977 
collected to that date, a fund of $2,400 was left, and, in partial compensation for our 
services, this was turned over to me, as were the fees for future registrations.” While 
McCormack felt justified in taking this money after all his hard work, it had not been set 
aside for him by the state government, and it was a unilateral decision of the State Board 
of Health to award him money which could have gone to further health work. Similarly, in 
May 1906, the board decided that in compensation for their services grading papers for 
doctors’ examinations, “as the board always felt a freedom in using [the registration fee 
fund] which did not apply to that appropriated by the State, and on account of the increased 
duties it was decided… that the accumulated fund and future fees, after paying all expenses, 
should be divided in the ratio of one-tenth for each member, and three-tenths for the 
secretary.” There is no record of the registration fees from May 1906 in the financial 
statement from April 1, 1905 to April 1, 1907, which could indicate that the board was 
hiding something, or merely that, as McCormack expressed, they felt that the registration 
fee fund was totally separate from their annual appropriation and therefore unnecessary to 
include in their accounting.321 While these actions appear unethical, they do not give any 
further credence to Herrington’s allegations of a political machine. 
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Throughout the investigation, McCormack continued to receive the support of 
prominent colleagues. Dr. John G. South, current president of the state board of health, 
testified that he believed “there has been a deliberate effort on the part of some persons to 
create an impression on this committee and other members of the Legislature that I desire 
a change in our present medical law, and that I am personally opposed to Dr. J. N. 
McCormack,” and he wanted to speak before the committee on McCormack’s behalf. He 
said that he had known Dr. McCormack for thirteen years, and that he stood “second to no 
man in the world in health work.” He praised Dr. McCormack’s work in the smallpox 
epidemic of 1899 as exemplary. He also noted that regarding appointing members of the 
state board of health, “It has been charged that Dr. McCormack has a machine in this law 
that keeps him in office as secretary to the Board of Health. He has held the same office 
for thirty-three years continuously. I ask what kind of machine kept him in this office for a 
quarter of a century prior to the enactment of this law? I believe the man was built for the 
office, and not the office for the man.”322 
Similarly, Dr. W. W. Richmond filed a statement saying that he had been associated 
with Dr. McCormack for nearly forty years in the Kentucky State Medical Society, and 
that he had never known the doctor to dominate or control its proceedings. In fact, at one 
time in the early history of the Kentucky State Medical Society it was “largely controlled 
by certain individuals whose aim was personal benefit rather than the interest of the 
society.” Therefore, Dr. McCormack led a move to reorganize the society, increase the 
membership, and extend the society’s work into every county in Kentucky. This was part 
of his work on behalf of the American Medical Association and the wider effort to bring 
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doctors into organizations to increase the profession’s internal harmony. Richmond said 
that “Instead of domination, Dr. McCormack has done more to pacify and bring doctors 
into closer relation to each other to improve medical ethics, to raise the standard of medical 
education and to encourage doctors to study and better prepare themselves to prevent 
sickness and treat disease, than any other doctor in the United States.” As South and 
Richmond’s statements show, McCormack was generally held in high esteem by other 
members of his profession, at least partially refuting the claims that he dominated or 
controlled the medical organizations to which they belonged.323 
However, this opinion was not universal. Dr. C. H. Vaught of Richmond, Kentucky, 
felt that “the reason Dr. McCormack has been able to maintain his power and control is 
because he has been a politician and legislative agent for over thirty years, devoting a large 
part of his time to such work, while the doctors in the State have been busy with their 
professional duties.” Vaught alleged that McCormack had been able to keep himself in 
power for so long because of his control of the State association and House of Delegates. 
He also believed that it was his father’s influence which had allowed Dr. Arthur 
McCormack to hold a number of positions in the health structure of Kentucky, including 
Assistant secretary to the State Board of Health, State Sanitary Inspector, and delegate to 
the American Medical Association, among others. In addition, he asserted that it was 
because of J. N. McCormack that Arthur’s partner, Dr. Lillian South, held the position of 
State Bacteriologist, although she had claimed earlier in the inquiry that “I was promised 





objected on account of my partnership with his son.”324 While the committee had initially 
believed that Dr. South was incompetent, after her testimony they said that “they never 
heard a more brilliant witness or one that showed to be better advantage.”325 It is possible 
that part of the committee’s initial motivation for the investigation was due to Dr. South 
being a woman, but this does not seem to be the main motive and her testimony appears to 
have exonerated her as recipient of nepotism. 
While Dr. Vaught’s accusations were potentially credible, the heart of his grievance 
with Dr. McCormack was his belief that the doctor had cheated him out of an election. 
According to him, in 1908 he had been a candidate for president of the State association, 
and that the McCormacks favored his opponent, Dr. I. A. Shirley, to win. The day before 
the election sixty-five delegates were present, and the day of the election there were 
seventy-five. Vaught asserted that all the late arrivals favored Dr. Shirley, causing him to 
win. Vaught offered no definitive proof, only his suspicions that he had been overruled by 
Dr. McCormack’s wishes, as his friends had put him up for election to run against the 
“McCormack machine.”326 
Finally, on February 26, 1912, six weeks after the investigation began, the news 
came that Dr. McCormack was to be exonerated. In its report, the committee on Kentucky 
statutes would vindicate his administration, but recommend that the state inspector and 
examiner oversee the state board of health in addition to their other duties.327 Despite these 
reports, Herrington continued his attacks. After all the testimony, Representative 
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Herrington made only three specific charges against Dr. McCormack. He asserted that 
“prior to 1906 the people’s money and that of Dr. J. N. McCormack… were one and the 
same, both being deposited to his individual account and checks for personal expenses 
being drawn from that same bank account.”328 In connection with this, he alleged that over 
$13,600 drawn from the appropriation fund should be returned to the people, and that Dr. 
McCormack was given thirty percent of fees from applicants to become physicians, while 
the other members of the board received ten percent.329 While Herrington accused 
McCormack of having built up a powerful machine, in this article he gave no more 
evidence than these charges of financial malfeasance. 
In response to the claims from Mr. Herrington, McCormack’s counsel Judge Lewis 
McQuown charged that the investigation itself was invalid, as it was conducted as part of 
a bill to change the way members were appointed to the State Board of Health, and not as 
a separate inquiry into the Board of Health itself. Judge McQuown said that while 
Herrington had brought in many witnesses to prove the existence of a McCormack 
machine, this charge was not supported by “any of them except Dr. J. C. Mitchell and Dr. 
C. H. Vaught, who had not furnished a single fact to bear out assertions of the same 
character that formed the framework of Mr. Herrington’s brief.” On the other hand, other 
men had testified that “Dr. McCormack had framed the plan of organization on such broad 
lines as to make political methods impossible.” McQuown asserted that the investigation 
into McCormack was supported by the enemies of pure food and drug legislation who had 
assailed McCormack’s colleague Dr. Wiley, and that “certain papers filed by Mr. 
Herrington were the same papers that had been used in that unholy crusade and which had 
 




followed Dr. McCormack in his lecture tour from ocean to ocean.” Aside from this, 
however, McQuown did not offer any specific proof that Herrington was connected with 
the enemies of pure food and drug legislation.330 Similarly, the Berea, Kentucky Citizen 
asserted that the investigation was conducted on behalf of the patent medicine business.331 
However, like McQuown, they did not offer any concrete evidence of this claim. 
 Here Representative Herrington finally gave a detailed account of how he believed 
the machine to work. He alleged that Dr. McCormack appointed 357 members of the 
County Boards of Health without consulting the other members of the State Board of 
Health, instead referring to members of the State Medical Association. He also alleged that 
nearly every member of the “house of delegates” of the State Medical Association were 
active members of the county societies who had been McCormack’s appointees to the 
county boards of health. These appointments to county boards of health, who were then 
active in county medical societies and later selected as delegates to the State Medical 
Association comprised the machine Dr. McCormack was said to have operated. Herrington 
also believed that Dr. Arthur McCormack, Dr. Lillian South, and Dr. Smock, who was the 
son of Dr. McCormack’s foster sister, were all appointed due to nepotism. In addition, he 
felt it was inappropriate for the State Board of Health to be run out of Dr. McCormack’s 
house in Bowling Green and found it suspicious that the State Medical Association was 
also headquartered in there. In essence, Herrington charged that the machine was built to 
keep the state’s public health affairs as McCormack preferred them, as “He uses what he 
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has to keep you from taking away from him anything he has and to compel you to give him 
more.”332 
After hearing this testimony, the Committee on Kentucky Statutes met in an 
executive session. The committee decided that it would report Herrington’s bill adversely 
and recommend the present law on appointing members of the State Board of Health 
remain unchanged. It would also oppose removing the Health Department from Bowling 
Green to Frankfort. Next, it would pronounce the Board of Health’s work “proficient and 
satisfactory in the matter of its health work.” Finally, they recommended that the State 
Examiner and Inspector should oversee the State Board of Health’s financial conditions as 
they did in other state departments.333 
 Upon hearing the findings of the committee, Herrington was unrepentant. He again 
went over the fees that McCormack was paid by doctors, applicants for examinations, 
doctors moving into the state, students, and appropriations made by the Legislature. He 
alleged that “If I had time to ascertain accurately what [students’ and doctors’] fees alone 
have aggregated since Dr. McCormack has been in control, I believe it would be a sum 
sufficient to stamp out all the ‘hookworms’ in Kentucky.”334 Herrington did not object only 
to the money that he believed McCormack had taken himself, but to the expenses necessary 
for operating the board itself. He charged that in addition to the $30,000 appropriation from 
the legislature and the $12,000 bill for printing, it cost an additional $50,000 to put the vital 
statistics law into operation.335 He made this charge notwithstanding that putting the vital 
 






statistics law into practice was one of the original duties of the State Board of Health.336 
He objected to the fact that fiscal courts of the counties had paid that money, rather than 
the board.337 Given these objections, he recommended, as had the Committee on Kentucky 
Statues, that the Governor require the State Inspector and Examiner to make a thorough 
investigation of all the accounts, as “Previous investigations have been too superficial.”338 
He detailed the financial malfeasance that he believed McCormack had engaged in, laying 
out the individual accounts and vouchers at issue. He alleged that McCormack had worked 
as both the Secretary of the State Board of Health and the State Sanitary Inspector from 
1900 to 1907. He concluded that “Since he claimed he was working for the ‘pittance’ of 
$1,200 annually, he should be required to refund the $1,000 salary for the entire seven 
years, that is $12,000.”339 According to him, this made $13,600 from the appropriation 
fund that should be recovered. Nonetheless, the committee had decided on its 
recommendations, and Herrington was overruled. 
 Finally, on March 5, 1912, almost three months after it had begun, the inquiry into 
the affairs of Kentucky’s State Board of Health concluded. According to the Franklin 
Favorite, the House of Representatives had “vindicated him of the charge of reckless 
expenditure of the funds of the State Board of Health brought by Representative 
Herrington, of Madison County.” However, the newspaper noted that the Speaker of the 
House had “railroaded through” McCormack’s exoneration based merely on the yells of 
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the men in the chamber, a process that did not allow for the recognition of any dissenting 
voices. They felt that Representative Herrington’s voice should have been heard, as “it was 
his measure, and he had the prerogative to move that the bill be advanced, the report of the 
committee to the contrary notwithstanding. The speaker refused to recognize him, and 
declared the report adopted.” The Favorite felt that such unilateral decisions of the speaker, 
even if they had gained the vindication of the State Board of Health, would bring trouble 
in the future. They did note, however, that there was no sign that Dr. McCormack had 
played a part in bringing about this silencing of Mr. Herrington. In addition, they argued 
that “There is nothing to indicate that the report of the committee was not the sense of the 
House, except that the Speaker was afraid to put it to the test,” and it would have been 
better if he had used fair methods to bring about this outcome.340 
 In the end, after three months of investigation by the Committee on Kentucky 
Statutes in the House of Representatives, Dr. Joseph McCormack and his beloved State 
Board of Health were exonerated. The appointment of their members would remain under 
the control of the state’s doctors rather than politicians, and their appropriation would 
remain unchanged. It is still unclear exactly why Representative Herrington chose to 
investigate the conduct of the board and Dr. McCormack. However, it shows that despite 
having finally received enough money to carry out the actions for which it was created, 
there were those in the Legislature who opposed expending even that modest amount in 
the service of public health work. 
 After all the testimony offered on both sides, it is challenging to draw an 
unambiguous conclusion on the question of whether Dr. McCormack had retained his place 
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on the State Board of Health by operating a political machine. Dr. Vaught and 
Representative Herrington certainly thought so, but neither had proof beyond their 
accusations. Influential doctors such as John G. South and W. W. Richmond testified to 
Dr. McCormack’s skill and magnanimity, with Dr. South going so far as to state that he 
believed “the man was built for the office, and not the office for the man.”341 McCormack 
himself had given a thorough account of his work on behalf of the state, and had explained 
that the board was headquartered in Bowling Green to save money, rather than for his 
personal convenience. If there was a machine, the question seems to come back to 
Herrington’s early claim that he was “trying to ascertain whether or not Dr. J. N. 
McCormack, Secretary of the State Board of Health, has a machine or is a one-man power, 
and if so, whether or not it is a good or bad machine.”342 Herrington had clearly decided 
that it was a bad machine, and seemed to have a personal dislike for McCormack for which 
there is no discernable cause. Yet the State Board of Health had achieved a remarkable 
expansion of public health on limited funds during McCormack’s tenure as Secretary, 
enabled in no small part by Dr. McCormack’s influence and charisma. Given their 
achievements of repelling yellow fever, virtually eradicating smallpox, and implementing 
prevention measures through the Departments of Bacteriology, Sanitary Engineering and 
Vital Statistics, if such a machine existed it was, on the whole, a good one. For Dr. 
McCormack, even though he was absolved of the charges Herrington had leveled against 
him, this draining investigation may have been the final proof that he had spent enough 
time as Secretary of the State Board of Health. After serving one more year in the position, 
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he ran for and won a seat as a Democratic Representative in the Kentucky Legislature for 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 
One hundred and ten years ago, Dr. Joseph N. McCormack listed the United States’s 
stunning death tolls from disease, and argued that: 
 
In striking contrast with this reckless disregard of life, which has no parallel 
in any other progressive nation, it should be a just cause of shame to have 
to record that, within the last ten years the U. S. Department of Agriculture 
has expended $40,000,000, and it is now proposed that $250,000,000 more 
be appropriated, to prevent tick fever in cattle, cholera in hogs and chickens, 
scab in sheep, pests to crops and trees, warning farmers as to the dangers 
from frost and blizzards, and for the protection of all money and commercial 
interests, while in all of our history medical men have never been able to 
induce those in authority to lift a hand or spend a dollar to protect the homes 
of the people, the men, women and children, from the domestic pestilences 
which levy an annual tax on them just as real and for [sic] heavier than that 
imposed for all governmental purposes.344 
 
These are the words of a man who spent the better part of his life attempting to protect the 
public health in a state and country which placed a lower value on people’s lives than their 
money. Throughout his career, Dr. McCormack fought to build a public health 
infrastructure which would prevent the spread of disease. This was a challenge in the rural 
state of Kentucky, where he and the other members of the State Board of Health faced 
limited appropriations from state lawmakers and opposition from local fiscal officials as 
well as the public. Their responses to these obstacles reveal their ingenuity as well as the 
limits to their imagination. The board both threatened and used quarantines to achieve its 
aims, provoking opposition from the public and government officials which feared the 
threat to their commercial interests. In other cases, they attempted to communicate the 
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importance of vaccination and disease prevention but failed to reach those marginalized 
populations who were most vulnerable to them due to a confident belief that by convincing 
the most prominent members of a community they could persuade everyone, as well as a 
lack of consideration for widespread illiteracy among Kentucky’s citizens. Kentucky’s 
example shows that in order to successfully prevent disease, a state’s public health 
infrastructure must be well-funded, able to communicate with every citizen on their own 
terms and empowered by law to enforce their edicts when necessary. 
 The issues Dr. McCormack identified in 1909 continue to plague us. There is a 
stark contrast between the way we have handled the COVID-19 pandemic and how the 
Kentucky State Board of Health might have handled it a century ago, although some 
elements remain the same. We continue to worry more about our economy than people’s 
lives, particularly in communities of color. Our health campaigns do not reach everyone. 
Despite the fastest development of vaccines in history, our distribution structure is 
inefficient, and we have difficulty convincing even medical personnel to be vaccinated. 
Even the straightforward measure of wearing a mask has been politicized. Given the 
experience of Kentucky’s State Board of Health in the early 1900s, especially in the ever-
present smallpox epidemic, it is clear that Kentuckians have resisted restrictions on their 
freedom from health officials for over a century. Yet in the past, the board had established 
laws and the power to enforce their measures, with penalties for noncompliance. Our 
current lack of such measures puts the public at large in danger, and we should learn from 
the experiences of the Kentucky State Board of Health.  
Over one hundred years ago, Dr. McCormack argued that the purpose of 
government is to do what we cannot do so well, or so cheaply for ourselves. If the success 
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of a government can be judged by the protection of its citizen’s lives, which by the nature 
of disease they cannot protect on their own, then our government has failed us. We need a 
public health infrastructure which is amply funded, public health campaigns which reach 
every person, no matter how marginalized, and to give our public health officials the power 
to keep people from spreading disease. Most of all, we need to protect human lives over 
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